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Channeling Unilateralism

Maggie Gardner*

When crime reaches across borders to threaten human security or undermine democracy, states often
respond by adopting multilateraltreaties that obligateeach of them to suppress the transnationalcrime at
home. These treaties help, but only to the extent that partiescomply with them. Because states generally
cannot enforce their laws outside their own territory, transnationalcriminals can evade prosecution as long
as some states are unable or unwilling to meet these treaty commitments. One solution for improving
compliance with these treaties may be, counterintuitively, more unilateralism. Using case studies on transnational bribery and drug trafficking, this Article develops a theory of "channeled unilateralism" to
explain how multilateralismandunilateralismcan reinforce one another to further the same ends. Treaties
that channel unilateralismare structured to help motivated states apply their laws to crimes that reach
beyond their borders. Specifically, the treaties endorse extraterritorialextension of prescriptivejurisdiction
and encourage the use of bilateralagreements for enforcement cooperation. These treaty provisions lower
reputationaland transactioncosts for motivated states to expand their enforcement efforts as long as those
efforts remain within the framework set by the treaty. Over time, these expanded unilateral efforts may
promote broader compliance with the treaty regime by improving information, peer-to-peer contacts, and
technical capacity. When channeled effectively, strong unilateral policies may strengthen rather than
weaken multilateralregimes.

INTRODUCTION

Transnational crime is more than just a law enforcement problem. In his
2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama identified transnational crime as a "key global challenge" because it "undermine[s] the
stability of nations, subverting government institutions through corruption
and harming citizens worldwide."' It is these structural harms to democracy, development, and human rights that distinguish transnational crime
2
from more routine offenses that coincidentally have foreign elements.
*

Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Bill Alford, Gabriella

Blum, Bill Burke-White, Jack Goldsmith, Phil Heymann, Michael Morley, Ganesh Sitaraman, Seth
Stoughton, Adrian Vermeule, and the participants at the American Society of International Law MidYear Research Forum and the New England Regional Junior Faculty Scholarship Workshop for helpful
comments and conversations, and to Kenyon Colli and Amanda Claire Grayson for their excellent research assistance.
1. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 49 (May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/rssviewer/national-securitystrategy.pdf.
2. I start from the understanding that transnational crime-which I define as networked crime that
reaches across borders and threatens state or human security-is a real (rather than rhetorical) problem
that harms civilians both directly (e.g., through exploitation) and indirectly (e.g., through local instability
in the form of murders and kidnappings). Some sociologists who study transnational policing are more
skeptical of the concept of transnational crime. See, e.g., MATHIEU DEFLEM, POLICING WORLD SOCIETY:
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION 221-24 (2002) (suggesting that
the problem of transnational crime has been developed in part to justify the internationalization of
policing); J.W.E. Sheptycki, Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the TransnationalArena: Reflections on
the War on Drugs, 24 INT'L J. SOC. L. 61, 64-65 (1996) (terming the litany of transnational crime as the
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Transnational criminals sell human beings, corrupt government officials,
arm dangerous groups, subvert financial systems, steal natural and cultural
resources from impoverished populations, and subject civilians to wanton
violence through organized crime, piracy, and terrorism.3
States' ability to respond to these threats is limited, however, by the basic
tenet of international law that prohibits each state from enforcing its laws
beyond its territory without the permission of the other state.4 In other
words, a state cannot physically investigate or seize evidence or suspects in
foreign countries, even though transnational crime by definition extends
across borders. On their own, states concerned about a particular transnational crime and willing to invest resources in suppressing it-what this
Article terms "motivated states"-can pursue those efforts only so far.
Cross-border cases are costly and time-consuming to investigate, and transnational criminals can easily move their operations beyond the reach of cooperative states.5 Meanwhile, other states that are affected-sometimes
egregiously-by transnational crime may lack the institutional or economic
capacity to respond effectively.
This is the enforcement gap in transnational criminal law: the space in
the international order where states that have jurisdiction are unable or unwilling to enforce laws against transnational crime and where other states
with the means and motivation to do so cannot reach. 6 States have attempted to address this problem with multilateral treaties that require each
state to suppress the crime within its own territory. 7 These so-called "suppression conventions" cover everything from terrorism 8 to money laundering 9 to firearms trafficking. 10 Suppression conventions can only help narrow
the enforcement gap, however, if states fulfill their treaty commitments to
"folk devils" that "sustain( I the transnational law enforcement enterprise"). The debate over the construction of "transnational crime," though of critical importance, is ultimately larger than the scope of
this project. The focus here is instead more practical: accepting that transnational crime is a problem, and
given existing power disparities, how can both weaker and stronger states use international law to reduce
its occurrence?
3. See, e.g., Hans-J6rg Albrecht, The UN TransnationalCrime Convention: An Introduction, in THE CONTAINMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 1-2 (Hans-Jibrg Albrecht & Cyrille Fijnaut eds.,
2002). For a popular account, emphasizing the economic context of these crimes, see Moisgs NAfM,
ILLICIT (2005).

4. See, e.g., VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 (2007).
5. See Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political Economy of
Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 830-31 (2009) (discussing the displacement of
transnational crime to weaker states, as well as the negative externalities created by states unwilling to
suppress these crimes domestically); Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and
State Capacity in TransnationalLaw Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 15, 28 (2004) (noting ability of
criminal finance offenders in particular to shift resources to weaker jurisdictions).
6. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Dollar Unilateralism: The New Frontline of National Security, 90 IND. L.J.
293, 302-03 (2015) (describing challenge of transnational crime).
7. See, e.g., NEIL BOLSTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 275 (2012).

8. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229 (hereinafter Financing of Terrorism Convention].
9. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature
Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 275.
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update their laws and cooperate in investigations. This leads to a secondorder problem that has generated an extensive literature: how to ensure that
states comply with their treaty obligations. I"
Treaties typically do not include coercive enforcement mechanisms. Instead, as with much of international law, enforcement of treaty obligations is
diffused and indirect.' 2 International organizations can help "manage" states
towards greater compliance. 3 They can also increase the costs-particularly
the reputational costs-of noncompliance. 14 Networks of experts, bureaucrats, and activists can foster normative commitments1 5 and build domestic
capacity for more compliant behavior. 16 Strong states invested in a particular
treaty regime may use sanctions, or other coercive interventions, to pressure
weaker states into compliance.1 7 These unilateral sanctions may also help
develop and spread underlying norms over the long run.' 8 This focus on
coercion, however, obscures the work being done by "soft" unilateralism, or
unilateral acts not directed against other states qua states, in promoting
treaty compliance.
This Article proposes that one solution to both the enforcement and the
compliance problem is to structure treaties to channel this soft unilateralism. "Unilateralism" can be a loaded term, tainted by its more pejorative
use in the political realm.' 9 It is used here in its more traditional, legal sense
to mean the independent actions of a state taken without any expectation
that other states will reciprocate. I am not alone in suggesting that unilateralism can be a boon rather than a bane for the international order. For example, unilateral acts can help generate international law when multilateral
10. Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, openedfor signature May 31, 2001, 2326 U.N.T.S. 237; Arms Trade Treaty, openedforsignature
Mar. 28, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.217/2013/L.3 (entered into force Dec. 24, 2014).
11. For a recent summary of this literature, see Jana von Stein, The Engines ofCompliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF

THE ART 477 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).

12. See, e.g.,

ROBERT

0.

KEOHANE,

AFTER HEGEMONY:

COOPERATION

AND DISCORD

IN THE

WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 98 (2d ed. 2005).

13. See

ABRAM

CHAYES & ANTONIA

HANDLER CHAYES,

THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:

COMPLIANCE

WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (describing managerial model of building

compliance with international commitments).
14. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 103-06; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
InternationalLaw, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
15. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
16. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the
Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2002).
17. See generally, e.g., Alexander Thompson, Coercive Enforcement in InternationalLaw, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 11, at 502,
504.
18. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalizationand U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,6-7
(2001).
19. On the more standard, skeptical account of unilateralism vis-ii-vis the international order, see, for
example, Christine Chinkin, The State That Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan or Iconoclast?, 11 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 31 (2000).
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processes fail, 20 promote the internalization of international norms, 21 coerce
reluctant states to comply with international commitments,2 2 and generate
convergence around higher regulatory standards. 23 The argument here,
however, goes beyond recognizing that unilateralism and multilateralism
can be compatible, or even that they can be directed against the same problem. 24 Instead, it emphasizes how unilateralism and multilateralism can reinforce one another in a dynamic, productive relationship. 25 When treaties
channel unilateralism, they invite unilateral actions that in turn support the
treaty regime, creating a positive feedback loop that improves both compliance and effectiveness over time.
Located somewhere between theory and practice, this Article draws on
case studies of two suppression conventions and thick descriptions of several
more to identify mechanisms, mostly rational in the short term but also
normative in the long term, 26 that explain how treaties and unilateralism
20. See Daniel Bodansky, What's So Bad about UnilateralAction to Protect the Environment?, 11 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 339, 340, 344-45 (2000) ("In such cases, another less pejorative term for unilateralism is
leadership."); Monica Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 105 (2014); Gregory Shaffer

& Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilateralismand International Law, 1 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 31,
38-39 (2011).
21. See Cleveland, supra note 18.
22. See Cuallar, supra note 5, at 32-33.
23. See, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012); see also DAVID VOGEL,
TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995) (describing how national regulations can have transnational effect in instigating a "race to the top").
24. See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 69 ("But unilateralism is not inherently hegemonic, and unilateral
measures which are crafted with proper respect for international law principles can complement, rather
than compete with, the development of a multilateral system."); Hakimi, supra note 20, at 110 (noting
that state power can be good for international law).
25. In her transnational legal process account of the development and spread of human rights norms,
Professor Sarah Cleveland focuses on one dimension of this relationship: how unilateral actions can promote multilateral standards. See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 90. Professor Monica Hakimi has more
recently explored how unilateralism can constructively create and strengthen international law, particularly when other states are intransigent. See Hakimi, supra note 20, at 107-08. Professors Gregory Shaffer
and Daniel Bodansky have identified a similar law-making dynamic in the context of environmental law,
with the added insight that international law "has a critical but delicate role to play... in disciplining
unilateral action" by forcing the unilateral actor to clarify and justify its goals. See Shaffer & Bodansky,
supra note 20, at 40; see also Bodansky, supra note 20, at 342-43 (describing different ways in which
unilateralism spurs, enforces, or embodies international law). This Article emphasizes the opposite direction-how multilateral instruments can also promote certain unilateral actions-in describing an iterative, self-reinforcing cycle between the multilateral and the unilateral. While Professor Kal Raustiala has
identified a synergistic relationship between multilateral treaties and state action, he has focused on the
role of transnational government networks. See Raustiala, supra note 16, at 6. The dynamics he analyzes
involve not so much unilateralism and multilateralism, but rather different forms of multilateral
cooperation.
26. The Article thus acknowledges that both rational and normative perspectives provide important
insights into how international law works. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and
Interests: InternationalLegalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES S141, S142 (2002);
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG.
887, 888 (1998) ("[R]ationality cannot be separated from any politically significant episode of normative
influence or normative change, just as the normative context conditions any episode of rational choice.");
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (2002); Peter
J. Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, InternationalOrganizationandthe Study of World
Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 645, 682-83 (1998) (insisting solely on a rationalist or a normative framework
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can reinforce one another. First, states make rational trade-offs in deciding
to establish a treaty targeting a transnational crime. Motivated states join
the treaty regime because it will reduce the cost of actions they already plan
to pursue. Other states will join because they share the normative commitment to suppressing the crime in question but lack the capacity to do so
themselves ("limited states"). Additional states with similar normative
commitments will join but then free ride on the motivated states' efforts
regardless of their own capacity to help ("lagging states"). And still other
states may join due to inducements, such as aid or linkage to other issues,
but lack the normative commitment or motivation to take any additional
action ("reluctant states").
Second, the treaty makes some unilateral efforts targeting the transnational crime easier for motivated states and others harder. Specifically, the
treaty can harmonize domestic laws, endorse extraterritorial exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction, 27 and make bilateral cooperation cheaper and more
efficient. All of this helps motivated states pursue more unilateral efforts
within the parameters of the multilateral regime. At the same time, however, the treaty raises the cost of pursuing unilateral efforts that are not
specifically endorsed by the treaty. When options are excluded from the
multilateral consensus, they appear less-than-legal, contrary to international
law in spirit even if not in technicality. Domestically, this aura of illegality
empowers opponents of aggressive unilateral efforts to argue for restraint.
Internationally, it can cause other states to deny cooperation, if not protest
the apparent overreaching of the motivated state. In short, the treaty
changes the conversation: some options now look more legal and others less
28
So.
Since legality matters to liberal states-either because of their normative commitment to legality or because legality changes their rational calculations, but probably due a bit to both-the treaty channels the motivated
state's actions at the same time that it legitimates them.
Third, unilateral efforts reinforce the compliance pull of the treaty. This
process takes place over a longer time horizon, providing more opportunities
would be a "sterile intellectual exercise" as "neither project can be complete without the other"); see
also generally James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (critiquing framing of
international relations debate by Katzenstein et al., supra, as between normative and rational
perspectives).
27. In the context of jurisdiction, the term "extraterritorial" can have many connotations, most of
them negative. See, e.g., CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-9 (2008). This
Article uses the term to refer to conduct occurring primarily outside the territory of a given state, as well
as to that state's efforts to reach such conduct.
28. Cf Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the Next
Generation ofIL/IR Scholars, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 11, at 33, 35 (noting the "distinctive politics" of legalization as
"shaped and constrained by law and legal institutions"); Bodansky, supra note 20, at 342 ("(Few 'unilateral' decisions are taken by a state in complete isolation-usually, a state must at least consider the views
of other states and how they will react.... [T]he unilateral character of a decision is not all or nothing,
but rather more or less.").
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for normative mechanisms to shape the preferences on which states make
rational decisions. 29 Scholars have previously identified how multilateral institutions (treaties, organizations, and networks) can promote treaty compliance by (i) increasing information, (ii) providing for repeated interactions
among sub-state actors, and (iii) directing technical assistance towards states
that wish to comply but lack the capacity to do so. 30 This Article argues that
unilateral efforts aligned with a treaty can have similar effects. For example,
cross-border investigations led by motivated states will entail repeated interactions among peers and the sharing of technical expertise. Bilateral cooperation agreements may come with aid for institution building and training.
High profile cases pursued by motivated states can shed light on the inertia
of lagging states, much to their domestic and international embarrassment.
By helping to build the capacities of limited states, raising the reputational
stakes for lagging states, and spreading norms that may over time sway even
reluctant states, unilateral efforts can strengthen the treaty regime. And as
more states are motivated and empowered to suppress transnational crime
within their borders, the end result should be a self-reinforcing cycle of
treaty promotion and domestic reform that shrinks the enforcement gap over
time.
Admittedly, this model of channeled unilateralism relies on privileging
already powerful states; the motivated state will typically be a wealthier
nation with extra resources at its disposal, and its extraterritorial effortseven if invited by a multilateral regime-will serve to export its law enforcement policies and priorities. 31 Still, channeled unilateralism may be a
second-best solution in a world of unequal states. Whether viewed from a
human rights, economic development, or security perspective, the problem
of transnational crime is a significant challenge that needs to be addressed.
And less powerful states are not passive takers of norms and policies; this
Article's description of channeled unilateralism draws attention to the inputs, priorities, and cooptation strategies of these states. Channeled unilateralism should enable most states to experience benefits even if the
distribution of those benefits is uneven.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I expounds on the enforcement gap
in transnational criminal law. It sets out the basic principles of jurisdiction
under international law, describes how these principles limit domestic law
enforcement efforts, explains why the system of international criminal law is
not well suited for addressing transnational crime, and identifies the shortcomings of relying solely on a multilateral approach. Part II develops the
29. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S155-57 (emphasizing the interplay between normative
values and rational interests over time).
30. See discussion in Part II.C., infra.
31. See, e.g., Andrew Goldsmith et al., Making Sense of TransnationalPolice-Building:Foreign Assistance in
Colombian Policing, in CRAFTING TRANSNATIONAL POLICING: POLICY CAPACITY-BUILDING AND GLOBAL
POLICING REFORM 73, 74 (Andrew Goldsmith & James Sheptycki eds., 2007) (acknowledging that
transnational policing relationships carry "inevitable structural inequalities").
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concept of channeled unilateralism in the context of transnational crime.
Part III uses case studies on transnational bribery and drug trafficking to
illustrate aspects of the model in practice. To be clear, these case studies
were selected to explore a possible explanation of state behavior, not to test
it; the project is not positive so much as descriptive and theoretical. Part IV
acknowledges that channeled unilateralism privileges powerful states but argues that it is not merely epiphenomenal of hegemony. Because the
problems of enforcement and treaty compliance are not limited to transnational crime, Part V concludes by offering some preliminary thoughts about
the applicability of channeled unilateralism to other transboundary harms.
I.

THE ENFORCEMENT GAP IN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The need for a solution like channeled unilateralism arises from the wellestablished limits on any one state's power to prescribe and enforce its laws.
This Part describes those limits, and it explains why unilateral enforcement
efforts, international criminal law, and multilateral treaties cannot, on their
own, work around those jurisdictional limits to resolve the enforcement gap
for transnational crime.
A.

Jurisdictionunder International Law

For purposes of international law, a state's jurisdiction is typically divided
into the power to prescribe, the power to enforce, and the power to adjudi33
cate. 32 The first allows the state to apply its laws to a particular subject.
The second allows the state "to induce or compel compliance" with its
laws, 34 power that encompasses criminal investigations, arrests and seizures,
and punishment.35 And the third allows it "to subject persons or things to
the process of its courts or administrative tribunals. "36
Each state has the undeniable right to exercise all three grounds of jurisdiction within its own territory. 3 7 Indeed, given the fundamental link between a state's territory and its sovereignty, each state has the exclusive right
to exercise enforcement jurisdiction within its own borders.38 As a corollary,
32. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1987); JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (8th ed. 2012); see also id. at 456 n.2
(noting possible division of adjudicative jurisdiction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction).
4
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 01(a) (1987).
34. Id.§ 401(c).
35. See, e.g., id.§ 432.
36. Id.§ 401(b).
37. A state's territory includes not just its land, but also its airspace, its internal waters, and its
"territorial sea," the twelve-mile strip of ocean along its coastline. LOWE, supra note 4, at 173-74. The
state may also exercise limited jurisdiction over particular types of activities in its maritime exclusive
economic zone ("EEZ"), which stretches for two hundred miles from the state's coastline. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55-57, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS).
38. See CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 478-79.
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the law enforcement officials of one state cannot legally operate in the territory of another state without the latter's permission.39 This is the practical
source of the enforcement gap.
40
A state may exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction more broadly, however.
Under modern international law, a state can justify extending its laws to
reach conduct outside its borders on five grounds. 41 This permissive rule is
meant to minimize interstate conflict over jurisdictional claims while protecting states' sovereign interests, which do not always stop at their borders. 42 Thus the closer that one state gets to the outer limits of the
permissive grounds, the more likely it is that other states will feel
threatened. For this reason, even though these five grounds of prescriptive
jurisdiction are widely recognized, their application in practice can be con43
troversial if pushed too far beyond the core zone of accepted state practice.
Consider, for instance, the first and primary basis of prescriptive jurisdiction, territoriality. No state could object to another state asserting its prescriptive jurisdiction over all conduct that begins and ends within its
borders. But there are also more expansive understandings of territorial jurisdiction: A state may extend its laws to conduct that starts within its
borders but is consummated or has its primary effects abroad ("subjective
territoriality"). 44 It may also extend its laws in the other direction, to conduct that occurs outside its territory but "has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory." 45 Such "objective territoriality," often
referred to as the "effects principle," can be controversial when the link
between the extraterritorial conduct and the territorial effect is attenuated or
46
complex.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. b (1987); LOWE, supra note 4, at

184.
40. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. 3, 169 (Feb. 14) (distinguishing enforcement jurisdiction, which is limited to a state's territory, from prescriptive jurisdiction, which may be asserted extraterritorially).
41. This is the modern rule, allowing a state to exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction only if permitted by
one of these five grounds. The classic rule allowed a state to exercise its power to prescribe as long as no
rule of international law explicitly prohibited it. Stated most famously by the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Case oftthe S.S. Lotus, the classic rule has now largely been replaced by the modern
rule. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 457-58; RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 21-22.
42. See RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 21 (noting that the modern approach to prescriptive jurisdiction
ismeant to divide up States' "spheres of action and thus reduc[e] conflicts between States").
43. See id.at 31-33 (arguing that, given the breadth of permissible bases for asserting jurisdiction
under international law, the legality of a particular assertion will depend on the reactions of other states).
One approach to minimizing jurisdictional conflict is for courts to exercise self-restraint through affirmative comity. LOWE, supra note 4, at 183. In the United States, for example, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations has proposed that courts apply a rule
of reasonableness when evaluating U.S. assertions of
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403
(1987).
44. SeeCRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 458.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(1)(c) (1987).
46. LOWE, supra note 4,at 173; see
also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402
cmt. d (1987); id. n.2 (noting the controversy over the U.S. invocation of the effects principle to regulate
foreign nationals' economic activities); CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 463 (describing that U.S. assertions
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Second, a state may extend its laws to reach the activities of its nationals
beyond its borders. 47 (For purposes of nationality jurisdiction, a corporation
is a national of the state in which it is incorporated. 48) To this extent, nationality jurisdiction is not disputed. It is less settled, however, whether and
when a state can assert nationality jurisdiction over the conduct of its corporations' foreign subsidiaries, 49 an issue of particular relevance in the transnational bribery context. 50
Closely related to nationality jurisdiction, though not entirely equivalent,
is a state's jurisdiction over ships and aircraft that fly its flag, no matter
where that vessel is located in the world.5 1 A ship on the high seas that flies
no flag is considered a "stateless vessel" (that is, it has no nationality) and is
52
thus subject to the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of all states.
Ships that fly more than one flag or that fraudulently fly the flag of a state in
which they are not registered are "assimilated" to stateless vessels and are
likewise subject to the jurisdiction of all states. 3 Although these concepts
are well-established, it is less clear how one determines that a ship is state54
less or should be assimilated to a stateless vessel.
Third, a state may extend its laws to reach extraterritorial conduct if that
conduct threatens the state's "essential security interests"5 5 or "the integrity
of governmental functions."' 56 This "protective principle" has traditionally
been applied narrowly, primarily to counterfeiting and espionage,57 which
are crimes directed against the very entity of the state.' Recent U.S. prac-

of jurisdiction under the effects principle "have provoked a strong reaction from a number of foreign
governments," including retaliatory legislation and diplomatic protests).
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(2) (1987).
48. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 168 (Feb. 5); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213 (1987).
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 414(2) (1987).

50. See Part III.A., infra.
51. LOWE, supra note 4, at 175; Robert C. F. Reuland, Interference with Non-NationalShips on the High
Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-StateJurisdiction,22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1161,
1164-66 (1989). Flag state jurisdiction is often compared to territorial jurisdiction, with ships cast as
"floating islands" of a state's territory, but that comparison breaks down in the context of enforcement
powers: while a state's enforcement jurisdiction within its territory is truly exclusive, its enforcement
jurisdiction over its vessels is subject to some limitations. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 402 cmt. f(1987) (flag state jurisdiction distinct from territorial jurisdiction); Thomas M.
Brown, For the "Round and Top of Sovereignty": Boarding Foreign Vessels at Sea on Terror-RelatedIntelligence
Tips, 59 NAVAL L. REV. 63, 68 (2010).
52. UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 110(1).
53. Id. art. 92(2); see also Reuland, supra note 51, at 1202-05.
54. The United States has taken a particularly broad view of the conditions under which a ship can be
assimilated to a stateless vessel, see Reuland, supra note 51, at 1200 n.140, a view that has been the
subject of some criticism, see, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated
Powers and UniversalJurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1200 (2009).
55. See, e.g., LOWE, supra note 4, at 176.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt. f (1987).
57. See id.; LOWE, supra note 4, at 176.
58. See CAWFORD, supra note 32, at 462 & n.53.
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tice in particular, however, has stretched the protective principle to reach
acts of terrorism and, more questionably, drug smuggling.19
The remaining two grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction are applied infrequently and are the most likely to provoke debate. Under the passive personality principle, states may sometimes assert jurisdiction over crimes
based on the nationality of the victim. 6° And under universal jurisdiction,
states may assert jurisdiction over a narrow set of crimes regardless of
whether they can establish any nexus to the conduct. 61 There is broad agreement that piracy is subject to universal jurisdiction. 62 War crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, torture, and slave trading are often included as
universal jurisdiction crimes as well, 63 though exercise of universal jurisdic-64
tion over such crimes may still be contentious and is limited in practice.
In sum, international law allows a state to assert prescriptive jurisdiction
over some conduct that occurs beyond its borders, albeit with varying degrees of acceptance by other states. But a state may not send its law enforcement officials abroad to investigate those crimes, arrest suspected offenders,
or seize forfeited assets absent the consent of the state where those offenders,
assets, or evidence are located.
B.

The Limits of Domestic Law Enforcement

Given these limitations, motivated states have three primary options for
reaching criminal conduct emanating from outside their borders: they can
claim broad prescriptive jurisdiction to extend the coverage of their laws
over the extraterritorial conduct or foreign actors; they can seek the assistance of other states in enforcing those laws abroad; and they can pressure
other states to increase their own domestic law enforcement efforts. Far from
being mutually exclusive, these options are typically used concurrently. But
each is subject to significant shortcomings when exercised in the absence of
a multilateral treaty.
First, broad assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction carry a range of costs.
Other states may object to invested states' efforts to push the outer bounds
59. See LOWE, supra note 4, at 176-77. While acts of terrorism may be (but are not always) directed
against the state itself, it is hard to see how drug trafficking could fit this paradigm.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 n.3 (1987). On criticisms of this principle, see, for example, CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at 461 (identifying passive personality as "much
criticized" and "considerably more controversial" than territoriality); LOWE, supra note 4, at 176 (referring to the passive personality principle as "a form of legal imperialism"). An increasingly accepted use
of passive personality jurisdiction, however, is in the prosecution of terrorism offenses. See CRAWFORD,
supra note 32, at 461.
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).

62. See, e.g., Maggie Gardner, Piracy Prosecutionsin National Courts, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 797, 802
(2012).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987); CRAWFORD, supra note 32, at

468.
64. See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 115-17.
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of their jurisdictional authority. 65 Even if protests are not forthcoming, the
motivated state may fear being perceived as unreliable in its international
undermining jurisdictional principles
commitments, or it may wish to avoid
66
from which it otherwise benefits.
Second, motivated states can-and often do-ask other countries to use
their own law enforcement apparatus to assist with cross-border investigations. Such assistance usually takes one of three forms. First, states may
agree to extradite individuals accused of serious crimes, typically through
bilateral treaties and subject to limitations. 67 Second, states may agree to
gather evidence within their territory and transmit it to the requesting state.
Such requests are traditionally submitted through letters rogatory, but this
is a slow and cumbersome process: the letters must pass through multiple
diplomatic and bureaucratic channels and are acted upon solely as a matter
of comity. 68 Increasingly, states are obviating the need for letters rogatory by
establishing mutual legal assistance treaties (MIATs), in which they commit
to providing each other with such assistance as seizing evidence, freezing
bank accounts, and interviewing witnesses. 69 The United States and Switzerland signed the first MLAT in 1977;70 the number of MLATs has since
grown exponentially.7 1 Third, growing transnational networks of police,
prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies provide both formal and informal
support in cross-border investigations. This assistance can range from the
personal contacts of a liaison officer stationed in a foreign country 72 to the
international fugitive alerts broadcast by Interpol, the International Crimi73
nal Police Organization.

65. See id. at 133. For a recent example, consider the French outcry over the U.S. investigation of the
French bank BNP Paribas for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran and Sudan. See Ben Protess et al.,
French Officials Twist U.S. Arms in Bank Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/06/02/french-officials-twist-u-s-arms-in-bank-inquiry.
66. This concern partly explains the reticence of the U.S. Congress to test the limits of international
jurisdictional rules. For examples, see the discussion of the legislative history of the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act, infra Part III.B., and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, infra Part III.A.
67. See, e.g., ILIAs BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 373-76 (4th ed. 2010). Relatedly,
states may enter into prisoner transfer treaties, which allow convicted offenders to complete their prison
terms in their home state. See id. at 363-66; see also Benjamin Levin, Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for Sale:
The GlobalPrison Market, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509 (2014) (evaluating implications of paid prisoner
exchanges between countries).
68. See ETHAN A. NADELMANN,

Cops ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S.

CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 318-19 (1993).
69. See BANTEKAS, supra note 67, at 356.
70. NADELMANN, supra note 68, at 325, 334.
71. For example, the United States alone has at least fifty MLATs in place. DAVID LUBAN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 376 (2010).
72. See, for example, Nadelmann's detailed description of the work of agents for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in Europe and Latin America. See generally NADELMANN, supra note 68.
73. See Red Notices, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted (last visited Apr. 7,
2015).
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These channels of cross-border enforcement assistance have greatly aided
domestic law enforcement efforts and continue to deepen and expand. 74 But
how effective this assistance is depends, not surprisingly, on the two states'
diplomatic relationship as well as the requested state's capabilities and resources. 75 To the extent that transnational criminals seek out weak states,
ostracized states, or liminal spaces in the international order, these bilateral
channels will not help. The effectiveness of these general channels of assistance can also decrease when the crime being investigated is complex, rapidly evolving, high profile, or time sensitive-as the transnational criminal
conduct under consideration here typically is. For such crimes, states may
disagree on the illegality of the conduct, 76 or they may find the crime politically or diplomatically sensitive.7 7 As a result, extradition treaties' political
offense exceptions and requirements of dual criminality can block the extradition of suspects, 7 while MLAT requests may simply take too long. 79 And
the lack of transparency and accountability of informal cooperation can, particularly when time is short and stakes are high, encourage human rights or
due process abuses. 80 These problems can be ameliorated through clear definitions, political consensus, and specific commitments to cooperate regarding a particular crime-all of which can be supplied by a multilateral treaty.
Finally, motivated states may try to overcome the enforcement gap by
using economic incentives (or sanctions) to influence other states' law en74. See, e.g., Sean K. Driscoll, The Colombia Connection: An International Solution for an International
Problem (Harvard Law School Case Study 2014) [hereinafter Operation Bean Pot] (describing close working
relationship between U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officials and Colombian police in investigating,
arresting, and extraditing major Colombian drug traffickers to the United States from 2005 to 2010).
75. See Cubllar, supra note 5, at 28 (noting difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies attempting
to cooperate with counterparts abroad).
76. This is not an uncommon occurrence. A couple of decades ago, most states did not recognize
money laundering as a crime, and bank secrecy laws prohibited some states from disclosing information
or seizing assets necessary for prosecuting financial crimes. See Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar, The Tenuous
Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of CriminalFinance, 93 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 378 & n.262 (2003). States face similar troubles today over differing definitions of cybercrime. See Oona A. Hathway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817,
880-83 (2012). And even if both states agree in general that certain conduct is illegal, dual criminality
provisions in extradition treaties can block extraditions if the states differ in how they define the crime.
See, e.g., Joan Allain, No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists: Domestic Implementation of the Palermo Protocol,
7 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 111, 137 (2014).
77. Cf David Kennedy, The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei (Kennedy School of Gov't Case Study
C15-88-835.0 1988) (describing German hesitancy to extradite suspected terrorist to United States,
despite treaty commitments, given ongoing hostage situation).
78. See BOISTER, supra note 7, at 218, 223.
79. See JORG FRIEDRICHS, FIGHTING TERRORISM AND DRUGS: EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE
COOPERATION 160 (2008); Org. Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Typology on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Foreign Bribery Cases 25-27, 36 (2012) (hereinafter OECD Typology], availableat http://www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/TypologyMLA2012.pdf.
80. See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND

PROCEDURE 100 (2d ed. 2010) (noting recourse to abduction or rendition where formal extradition
arrangements are missing, inapplicable, or "seen as ineffective," and acknowledging such informal measures may violate human rights); if Katzenstein, supra note 6, at 301 (describing accountability concerns
arising from informal cooperation arrangements with private actors regarding transnational financial
crimes).
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forcement efforts. These pressures might be invoked directly by, for example, linking economic assistance to the receiving state's enforcement efforts
against a particular criminal threat. 8' Or the process may be more gradual,
like the exporting of law enforcement culture (e.g., enforcement priorities
and investigative tactics) to other countries through technical assistance and
82
the use of liaison officers.
Reliance on coercive tactics, however, is vulnerable to standard criticisms
of power imbalance, especially when the motivated state acts in the absence
of a multilateral consensus.8 3 It can instigate backlash in the pressured state
against perceived infringements on its sovereignty, particularly if the state
has had no input into the content of the prohibition or the prioritization of
its enforcement. 8 4 Such opposition is counterproductive if the end goal is
increased coordinated enforcement against transnational crime. 8' By giving
too much weight to the motivated state's domestic preferences and too little
consideration to the globally optimum level of enforcement,86 these tactics
also raise concerns about both democratic accountability and efficiency.
From the motivated state's perspective, coercive tactics are also costly, and
any influence may be circumscribed if the state is acting alone.
In sum, motivated states face reputational and political costs if they
stretch their prescriptive jurisdiction too far. They are also constrained in
their ability to gather evidence or seize perpetrators located beyond their
borders, and the standard channels for providing enforcement assistance may
not be quick, direct, or reliable enough to reach that evidence or those perpetrators in cases of sensitive transnational crime. Unilateral efforts to coerce
other states into providing greater assistance, even if they work in the short
term, can backfire. Besides which, cross-border investigations and extraditions are expensive, and the political capital to convince other states to cooperate is costly, imposing practical limits on any one state's efforts to counter
transnational crime.

81. See, e.g., Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 845; cf. Cleveland, supra note 18 (analyzing the use
of unilateral sanctions to promote human rights compliance).
82. See generally NADELMANN, supra note 68, at 12.
83. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 18, at 48-49 (summarizing criticisms of unilateral sanctions
regimes).
84. See Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 846. As an example, the U.S. decision to decertify aid to
Colombia in 1996 and 1997 has been credited with increasing, in the short term, the domestic standing
of President Samper, whom the United States had concluded was linked to the Cali drug cartel. See
Goldsmith et al., supra note 31, at 90.
85. Thus, for example, Professor Cleveland argues that unilateral sanctions are only beneficial in the
human rights context to the extent they align with multilateral standards. See Cleveland, supra note 18,
at 85.
86. See, e.g., Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 845-46; see also David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, TransgovernmentalNetworks and Domestic Policy Convergence: Evidencefrom Insider Trading Regulation, 64
INT'L ORG. 505, 520-21 (2010); William Magnuson, InternationalCorporate Bribery and UnilateralEnforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 360, 411-13 (2013) (noting in the context of transnational
bribery the risk of enforcement bias against foreign companies and over-enforcement due to lack of
coordination across countries).
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Given these shortcomings, motivated states have turned to multilateral
responses to global criminal threats. But as the remainder of this Part explains, these multilateral responses are not panaceas either.
C.

The Limits of InternationalCriminal Law

If transnational crime is a global threat and a cause of great human suffering, why not apply the existing structure of international criminal law to
suppress it? This is a common proposal, 87 but ultimately a misguided one.
International criminal law refers primarily to the supranational system of
adjudication that has developed over the last twenty years and covers a narrow set of crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. 88 During its recent period of rapid development, international
criminal law was the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry, both enthusiastic
and critical. There is no denying that international criminal trials are costly
and slow, nor that their supranational status often separates them both geo89
graphically and politically from the community affected by the crime.
They are also limited by the same basic principle of international law that a
state has exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over its territory. Thus the International Criminal Court (ICC) must still rely on individual states to seize
evidence, compel witnesses, search crime scenes, and arrest and transfer suspects to The Hague. 90 Indeed, the ICC may be worse positioned than individual states to address the enforcement gap, given that it must depend for
resources and diplomatic capital on member states that have competing
priorities. 91
Despite these limitations, however, international criminal law may provide the best solution for adjudicating certain types of crimes. In particular,
international criminal law was developed to address the unique challenges of
adjudicating crimes that implicate the state itself (conceived broadly to en87. See, e.g., Molly McConville, Note, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the
Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the InternationalCriminalCourt, 37 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 75 (2000); Regina
Menachery Paulouse, Beyond the Core: IncorporatingTransnationalCrimes into the Rome Statute, 21 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77 (2012); cf Sonja Starr, ExtraordinaryCrimes at Ordinary Times: InternationalJustice
Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1257 (2007) (calling for a selective broadening of international criminal law while acknowledging the practical and normative limits of international criminal
trials).
88. This limited list is drawn from the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC
has recently adopted a definition of the crime of aggression, but its jurisdiction over the crime is not yet
in effect.
89. See, e.g., CRYER, supra note 80, at 36; Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at InternationalCriminal
Courts, 29 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014) (collecting criticisms); Alex Whiting, In International
Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 323-25 (2009)
(same).
90. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 346, 442 (2d ed. 2008); William

W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the
Rome System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 65 (2008); Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point
of InternationalCriminalJustice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 330 (2008).
91. See CRYER, supra note 80, at 528-29.
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compass not only state officials, but also organized rebel groups and the
collective population of a state). 92 For example, the supranational authority
of international criminal law avoids immunity issues or amnesty laws that
typically block the prosecution of state officials in domestic courts. 93 It also
helps overcome political hurdles, like the state's protection of still-powerful
leaders or its reluctance to appear to pick sides between large segments of its
population; even if these hurdles can be overcome domestically, supranational adjudication can still provide greater impartiality, both in appearance
and in reality. 94 These are not concerns that are typically raised by transnational crimes like money laundering or human trafficking. While state officials may be implicated in transnational crimes, primarily through
corruption, such participation is in derogation of their political offices rather
than a public and collective effort to use state power for illegal ends. 95 And
without the need for the structural benefits of supranational adjudication,
the costs and limitations of international criminal law weigh more heavily in
the balance.
The link between the state and international crimes has also informed the
institutional design of international criminal courts, particularly their focus

92. See, e.g., ROBERT J. CURRIE, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 10, 17
(2010) (International crimes "will often have an element of state involvement in the criminal act, making
the suppression and prosecution of the crime more difficult and justifying a significantly higher level of
condemnation than would otherwise be necessary."); HELMUT SATZGER, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 180 (2012) (international crimes usually involve "macro-delinquency," meaning
the culpability of state authorities); EDWARD WISE, ELLEN PODGOR & ROGER CLARK, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 41-42 (2009) (international crimes "involve a misuse of power,
of the monopoly of violence commanded by state or quasi-state officials"); Neil Boister, 'Transnational
Criminal Law'?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 953, 965 (2003) ("International criminality is also characterized by
state involvement, which makes it impossible to expect justice to be carried out by the state itself and
requires the exceptional measure of international law superseding national law."). This focus on the state
traces back to the genesis of modern international criminal law in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials
following World War II.
93. See CASSESE, supra note 90, at 437; Bing Bing Jia, The Immunity of State Officials for International
Crimes Revisited, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1303, 1318 (2012).
94. See CASSESE, supra note 90, at 433, 438; cf Burke-White, supra note 90, at 62-63 (criticizing
states for self-referring cases to the ICC to avoid politically costly domestic trials).
95. See CASSESE, supra note 90, at 12-13 (distinguishing international from transnational crimes on
the basis that the latter "are normally perpetrated by private individuals .... [A]s a rule these offences
are committed against states. They do not involve states as such or, if they involve state agents, these
agents typically act for private gain, perpetrating what national legislation normally regards as ordinary
crimes."). But see Starr, supra note 87 (developing argument for including corruption on the level of
kleptocracy as an international crime). When state involvement in transnational crime does become significant, international criminal lay, may be the preferable solution. For example, most acts of terrorism
are domestic or have a primarily domestic effect. From time to time, however, an act of terrorism can be
so serious that it implicates entire states or threatens the stability of the international order. Thus when
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed in a terrorist attack in 2005 and it appeared that
Syria might have been involved, the U.N. Security Council established an internationalized tribunal in
The Hague, which combined aspects of Lebanese law with aspects of international criminal law. See
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007); see also Maggie Gardner, Reconsidering Trial in Absentia at the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon, 43 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 91, 93-95 (2011).
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on selective prosecutions of senior officials. 96 State involvement or collective
criminality increases the scale and gravity of these crimes, leading many
observers to conclude that the primary purpose of international criminal trials should be expressivism: these trials are meant to "affirm respect for law,
reinforce a moral consensus, narrate history, and educate the public." 97 Thus
international criminal tribunals have provided victims a larger role in proceedings and have attempted at times (though perhaps mistakenly 98) to contribute to the historical record. The result has been lengthy trials of only a
handful of individuals for only a handful of crimes. Transnational criminal
law, on the other hand, is a much more mundane endeavor. It does not need
symbolic and historic trials, but rather efficient investigations and relatively
routine prosecutions.
For the same reason, there would be no economies of scale or effort in
expanding or replicating international criminal law institutions to address
transnational crime. The need for more investigations and prosecutions alone
would require an exponential increase in resources, staff, and facilities 99 not to mention the difficult question of where to house the exponentially
larger number of defendants and convicted prisoners. 100 It is not simply a
matter of expanding the ICC's jurisdiction to include certain transnational
crimes; extending international criminal law to reach transnational crime
would require an undertaking of an entirely different magnitude. Indeed,
even though Trinidad and Tobago first called for an international criminal
court in 1989 as a solution for illicit drug trafficking, 10 1 transnational
crimes like drug trafficking were ultimately left out of the ICC's ambit in
part for these same practical reasons. 0 2 And the same practical reasons may
have caused the U.N. Security Council more recently to shelve proposals for
a supranational judicial solution to the problem of Somali piracy. 03 The
96. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
377-78 (1999).
97. MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2007); see also, e.g.,
CASSESE, supra note 90, at 438-40; Damaska, supra note 90, at 345-46.
98. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 90, at 360.
99. See Burke-White, supra note 90, at 66-67 (noting severely limited resources of ICC).
100. It is difficult enough to find placement for the handful of prisoners convicted in the international
criminal law system. See, e.g., R6isfn Mulgrew, On the Enforcement of Sentences Imposed by International
Courts: Challenges Faced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 373 (2009); Mary
Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars: A Conspicuous Oversight in the Development ofan InternationalCriminal Court, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 621, 636-39 (2003).
101. See Ant. & Barb. et al., International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal Activities: Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction Over Such Crimes
(Draft Resolution), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/44/L.18 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Draft Resolution).
102. See Patrick Robinson, The Missing Crimes, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTARY 497, 499-500, 503 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (listing, among
other reasons the drafters excluded drug crimes from the ICC's jurisdiction, the concern that they "would
overburden and flood the ICC" and "would be more effectively dealt with at the national level on the
basis of cooperative agreements").
103. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Somali Pirates:A Critical Evaluation of the Options, 10 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 767, 779-82 (2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on Possible Options to Further the Aim of
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system of international criminal law is not a practical solution for transnational crime.
D.

The Limits of Multilateralism

Short of asserting supranational authority through international criminal
law, the community of states can still address transnational crimes collectively through multilateral treaties. Indeed, the standard response to transnational crime in recent decades has been the adoption of suppression
conventions that oblige member states .to outlaw certain conduct, actively
enforce those laws, and cooperate with other states in doing so.
The potential benefits of developing widely ratified, multilateral treaties
have been thoroughly canvassed elsewhere. Multilateral negotiations allow
all states an opportunity to influence the content and scope of the new
rule. 10 4 Although "stronger states will remain strong in any setting," 1° 1 less
powerful states may still be able to shape the final outcome of a multilateral
treaty through coalition building or normative persuasion. 10 6 Multilateral
solutions also promote uniformity across domestic laws, which improves coordination in addressing global problems. 0 7 Uniformity in turn builds a
sense of universality and solidarity, which lends the multilateral consensus
greater normative weight 10 8 and may therefore increase state compliance
with the underlying norm. 0 9 Finally, multilateral processes force greater
disclosures of information on both the front and the back end: broader negotiations may reveal more information to more players about individual state
preferences, 110 while monitoring mechanisms built into multilateral regimes
can increase transparency and thus accountability of state efforts to implement the agreement."'
2
The drawbacks of a purely multilateral approach are also well canvased.i1
Most relevant here is the gap between treaty commitment and treaty comProsecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of
100-01, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010).
Somalia,
104. See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49
HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 341 (2008) (discussing perceived benefits of multilateral treaties).
105. Id. at 343.
106. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 6.
107. See Melissa J. Durkee, PersuasionTreaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 75-76 (2013).
108. See Blum, supra note 104, at 343-44.
109. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 7.
110. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S151 (2002) ("The very process of creating and implementing legal arrangements can generate information, helping actors to achieve joint gains immediately
or to strike interest-based agreements down the road.").
111. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 154-55.
112. For example, achieving consensus across a broad spectrum of states can require watered-down or
vague commitments capable of accommodating diverse local values and legal systems. See Jos6 E.Alvarez,
InternationalOrganizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 327 & n.18 (2006); Blum, supra note
104, at 350 (vagueness of multilateral treaties can reduce their normative weight); cf Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 20, at 33 (noting shortcomings of multilateral treaties in the context of environmental
law, including slow development, weak requirements, and uneven implementation). To the extent this
generalizing pressure is avoided and meaningful rules are adopted, the multilateral regime may instead
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pliance. States may not implement their multilateral obligations for any
number of reasons: perhaps because they lack the capacity to do So, 11 3 or
because implementation provides them with no greater benefit than they
have already gained through ratification," 4 or because they can free ride on
the enforcement efforts of motivated states,"' or because they perceive bene16
fits from allowing the criminal conduct to continue within their borders."
Under-enforcement by these states in turn generates negative externalities
l 7
for other states."
In sum, even when multilateral conventions can strike the right balance
between precision and flexibility, they still suffer from under-compliance.
Meanwhile, a purely unilateral approach raises serious accountability
problems and is limited by the finite resources, jurisdictional reach, and
diplomatic capital of individual states. But each approach can provide what
the other lacks: unilateral actions can increase pressure on other states to
comply with multilateral commitments, while multilateral treaties can
spread the financial burden and decrease the reputational costs of motivated
states' law enforcement efforts. Unilateralism within the context of multilateralism can achieve more than either can alone.
II.

A

MODEL OF CHANNELED UNILATERALISM

This Part outlines the potential dynamic relationship between unilateralism and multilateralism; the next Part explores the plausibility of this
description through case studies on transnational bribery and drug
trafficking.
A.

Stage 1: Establishing the Multilateral Treaty

Channeled unilateralism starts with the adoption and widespread ratification of a multilateral treaty. I accept here states' existing preferences regarding a given transnational crime, and I assume these preferences are static
within the immediate time frame of the treaty's negotiation and adoption,
an assumption to which I return in Part IV.1 18
be subject to criticisms of democratic deficit, for breaking the link between decision-makers and the
populations they represent. SeeBroude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 830. Ifa multilateral treaty establishes a rule with real content, that content may also prove too rigid. In the context of transnational
crime, conditions evolve and new threats emerge: multilateral solutions may prove inflexible, locked-in
and difficult to adapt to changing circumstances. See Durkee, supra note 107, at 73.
113. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13.
114. See Hathaway, supra note 26, at 2020; Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of InstitutionalDesign: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 665, 709 (2004).
115. See von Stein, supra note 11, at 480.
116. See Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 813-14; Magnuson, supra note 86, at 388.
117. See Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 830 (citing crime diffusion studies).
118. Other important preliminary questions are beyond the scope of the present project, such as
whether particular transnational criminal regimes are normatively desirable, see, e.g., Boister, supra note
92, at 956, or whether increased enforcement would lead to the most appropriate level of deterrence or
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At the outset, some states will have a strong preference for enforcing a
particular criminal prohibition as well as the means to invest in doing so. As
previously noted, purely unilateral efforts by such motivated states will have
practical limits."1 9 A motivated state may still choose to bear these costs,
particularly when it deems complete freedom of action to be critical. But
often it will be willing to compromise around the edges in order to make its
unilateral efforts cheaper. In exchange for some amount of compromise, a
treaty can provide motivated states with greater legitimacy for their extraterritorial efforts, as well as improved bilateral cooperation and ex ante agreement on the scope and prioritization of the criminal prohibition. 120 In
addition, domestic constituencies may urge the adoption of a treaty in order
to constrain the policy choices of future leaders 121 or to strengthen their
122
position vis-a-vis other domestic or foreign interests.
Other states may share the normative commitment to suppressing the
crime but may lack the technical capacity or resources to do so themselves.
By entering into a treaty regarding a particular crime, these "limited" states
may benefit from shifting the primary cost of enforcement to motivated
states in the short term and from the transmission of aid and knowledge in
the long term. 123 Limited states may also be concerned about the displacement of transnational criminal activity: if a motivated state is committed to
suppressing particular criminal conduct but is only able to do so within its
own territory, it could push more of that criminal conduct to other states
less prepared to prevent it. 2 4 Thus limited states may want to encourage
motivated states to apply their criminal laws more broadly, including over
extraterritorial conduct and foreign nationals, in order to minimize this risk
of displacement. 1 5 In exchange, limited states may be willing to agree to
relatively low-cost commitments, such as updating their criminal laws and
cooperating with motivated states to suppress crimes about which they are
26
already concerned.1
incapacitation, see, e.g., Koh, supra note 15, at 2641 (noting that "securing greater compliance with
treaties [is not] always good per se. Indeed, securing compliance may even be undesirable if the treaties
are themselves unfair or enshrine disingenuous or coercive bargains.").
119. See Part I.D., supra.
120. For further discussion, see Part II.B., infra.
121. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of InternationalAgreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501,
512-13 (2004); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 220 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 114, at 675.
123. See, e.g., LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the Success of the United
Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 227, 247-48 (2003);
Elizabeth Spahn, Local Law Provisions under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 249, 297 (2012) [hereinafter Spahn, Local Law) (noting with approval prosecutions of transnational
bribery by "stronger legal regimes" following outcries by constituencies in the state where the bribe was
paid).
124. Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 831.
125. Id. at 839.
126. Cf KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 96 (noting phenomenon of states eager to join international
regimes because "they expect to gain more, proportionately, than they contribute"). For Professor Keo-
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In contrast, "lagging" states have the technical capacity and resources to
enforce the criminal prohibition more actively, but they stand to benefit-at
least in the short run-by encouraging the motivated states' efforts without
undertaking any of their own. Updating laws and increasing enforcement
efforts carry some costs; inertia can also benefit domestic industry, which
can take advantage of questionable opportunities that are off-limits to businesses based in motivated states. 127 For example, when the United States
barred its companies from bribing foreign officials to secure business contracts, European companies gained a business advantage as long as their
home states did not adopt (and enforce) similar laws. 128 For lagging states,
the multilateral treaty comes with immediate benefits and delayed costs.
This leaves states that are agnostic towards or even skeptical of the proposed criminal prohibition. Some of these "reluctant" states may see a benefit in participating in the treaty negotiations in order to protect their own
interests, at least to some degree. Others may join the treaty, especially if it
appears to lack a strong monitoring mechanism, in order to gain approval
from other states or international organizations, even if they have no present
intention of implementing or enforcing the requisite domestic laws.' 29 Indeed, motivated states can encourage this nominal level of participation by
linking treaty ratification to other issues of greater concern to reluctant
states, like trade preferences or economic assistance.
Thus for differing reasons, states may find it in their interest, on balance,
to negotiate and join a suppression convention. The main purpose of these
suppression conventions is to harmonize domestic laws related to the transnational crime of concern. 130 In the short term, implementation by even a
few states has immediate benefits. States cannot enforce a law that is not on
their books (at least not consistently with international human rights standards). In addition, the more that states' laws differ, the more likely it is
that courts and officials will refuse extradition or conclude that MLAT obligations do not apply. By providing a basic definition around which states
can coordinate their laws, the treaty will help states avoid unintentional
discrepancies that block or slow enforcement efforts.
Nonetheless, initial implementation will be only partial. It takes time to
write and adopt laws,' 3' and states may delay implementation due to lack of
resources, lack of interest, or calculations that non-action is in their self-

hane, this free-riding can be resolved through improved information provided by international regimes
about state conduct. The proposition here is instead that motivated states may accept the risk of such
free-riding in the short term in order to gain multilateral approval for domestically motivated policies,
and that this initial imbalance of compliance can evolve over time into a more equally enforced regime.
127. Cf. Bradford, supra note 23, at 6 (noting competitive imbalance when firms in different states are
subject to different rules).
128. See Tarullo, supra note 114, at 687-88.
129. See Cufllar, supra note 5, at 43; Hathaway, supra note 26, at 2020.
130. See, e.g., BOISTER, supra note 7, at 14-15.
131. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 15.
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interest. 132 This is where the value of channeled unilateralism comes into
play: the extraterritorial efforts of motivated states, supported by the treaty,
can help narrow the enforcement gap in the short term and increase other
states' compliance with the treaty in the long term.
B.

Stage 2: Empowering and Constraining UnilateralAction

The suppression conventions typically invite greater unilateral efforts in
three ways: by harmonizing laws, endorsing jurisdictional claims, and encouraging bilateral cooperation.
First, by establishing an agreed-upon definition of the crime and prioritizing its enforcement, the treaty signals broad support for motivated states'
efforts to suppress that crime aggressively. States, as rational actors, benefit
from maintaining a reputation for keeping their treaty commitments be-3
cause it allows them to make more credible commitments in the future.1
Simply by codifying the multilateral consensus on the content and priority
of the criminal norm, the treaty can reduce the reputational risk to a motivated state for pursuing transnational investigations. Indeed, when treaties
obligate states to cooperate in suppressing the target crime, they increase the
reputational costs of opposing motivated states' efforts because such opposition can now be cast as a form of non-compliance.
Second, the treaty legitimates broader assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction. Although the suppression conventions are typically conservative in requiring states to assert jurisdiction on certain grounds, such as territoriality
or nationality, they also explicitly permit states to rely on additional jurisdictional grounds. 134 Since these additional jurisdictional grounds are still derived from established principles of international law, such permissive
provisions may seem largely rhetorical. But the outer bounds of a state's
jurisdictional authority are contentious: states dispute, for example, how
broadly jurisdiction based on objective territoriality can be applied, or135when
the assertion of jurisdiction based on passive personality is justified.
Thus it matters, for example, that the terrorism treaties approve states
exercise of jurisdiction when their citizens or their government are the target of a terrorist act. 136 States party to the suppression convention are es132. See, e.g., id at 10 (lack of resources); Hathaway, supra note 26, at 2020 (lack of additional benefit); Tarullo, supra note 114, at 687-88 (pay-offs from non-action and power of inertia).
133. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Reputation in International Relations and International Law Theory, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, mupra
note 11, at 524, 526 [hereinafter Brewster, Reputation); von Stein, supra note 11, at 481.
134. See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Corruption art. 42, openedfor signature Dec. 9, 2003, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC] (requiring states to establish jurisdiction based on territoriality and
ship registration, while permitting states to establish jurisdiction based on passive personality, nationality, and the protective principle).
135. See, e.g., LOWE, supra note 4, at 173, 176; see also Part I.A., supra.
136. See, e.g., Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 8, art. 7(2); see also LOWE, supra note 4, at
176-77 (noting how passive personality and the protective principle are invoked in jurisdictional provisions of the terrorism conventions).
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topped from objecting to other states parties' applying these explicitly
permitted grounds of jurisdiction. 3 7 More broadly, by affirmatively acknowledging states' right to assert jurisdiction based on passive personality
or the protective principle, the treaty signals to other countries that the
motivated state's extraterritorial reach is not a rogue or reckless act, but the
conduct of a responsible member of the international community confronting an acknowledged transnational threat. And it does seem that these
jurisdictional provisions have a practical effect: the case studies in Part III
suggest that the United States relies on suppression conventions when expanding the scope of its prescriptive jurisdiction. 38
Third, the treaty can encourage greater bilateral cooperation. The suppression conventions are replete with calls for states to assist each other in
investigating crimes, seizing evidence, freezing assets, and transferring suspects.13 9 By providing points of reference, these provisions can make bilateral cooperation more efficient.14 0 Most importantly, the suppression
conventions call on states to enter into formal, supplemental bilateral agreements that allow for closer and more tailored cooperation. Absent the treaty,
negotiating such bilateral enforcement agreements would be costly: the initiating state must expend diplomatic capital to broach the subject and convince the other state of its importance, and developing specific, workable
terms can involve expensive and lengthy negotiations.' 4 ' And without the
multilateral treaty, countries may be wary of entering into enforcement
agreements with motivated states; they might view the request as an unjustified incursion on their sovereignty, or they may not perceive any reciprocal
benefit, or they may simply have more pressing priorities.
A suppression convention can ease the negotiation of such agreements in
two significant respects. First, the treaty reduces transaction costs by establishing prior agreement on baseline issues, including the definition of the
crime and the importance of its repression.' 4 2 Many of the suppression conventions also suggest specific types of agreements and provide terms for in-

137. See BOLSTER, supra note 7, at 137-38.
138. See Part III.A. and III.B., infra. An alternative interpretation is that the United States seeks out
multilateral treaties in order to justify predetermined decisions to expand its prescriptive jurisdiction.
But that interpretation still presupposes that the multilateral treaty provides meaningful legitimacy.
139. See, e.g., UNCAC, supra note 134, chs. IV (international cooperation), V (asset recovery) & VI
(technical assistance and information exchange).
140. Continuing with the example of UNCAC, consider Article 46, which commits states parties to
providing mutual legal assistance; provides twenty-eight paragraphs of detailed provisions regarding
what such assistance should look like; and then instructs states to consider "concluding bilateral or
multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give practical effect to or
enhance the provisions of this article."
141. See, for example, the account of the decade-long negotiation of the first MLAT with Switzerland
in NADELMANN, supra note 68, at 324-34.
142. See Blum, supra note 104, at 372 ("In most cases, the existence of a prior [multilateral treaty),
which signals a broad recognition of the underlying norms and interests, makes it easier and at times
even possible to conclude a complementary [bilateral treaty].").

2015 / Channeling Unilateralism
clusion, l4 3 while an international organization charged with monitoring the
treaty may also consolidate early state practice and create model agreements
for states to use. 14 4 All of this additional information and these pre-established points of agreement lower the cost for the initiating state to approach
possible partners while improving the efficiency of the subsequent
negotiations.
Second, the consensus established by the treaty shifts the reputational
calculations for states considering bilateral agreements. The treaty will reduce reputational risks for the contracting states by assuring third party
observers that the agreement is well within the bounds of international law
and is not an instance of overreaching by the initiating state (or of capitulation by the responding state). At the same time, the treaty can increase the
affirmative reputational benefits of entering into bilateral agreements. In
particular, states approached by motivated states can appear more compliant
with their international legal obligations without having to invest significantly more of their own resources in enforcement.
These bilateral (or occasionally regional) agreements hold great potential
for narrowing the enforcement gap for transnational crime. As a practical
matter, given the sensitive nature of a state permitting any other state's law
enforcement personnel to operate within its territory, these bilateral agreements allow for "more daring and more generous" experiments in enforcement cooperation than states could achieve multilaterally. 14 5 Bilateral
agreements can also be tailored to reflect the relationship and tolerances of
14 6
individual states in ways that multilateral treaties simply cannot.
In exchange for these benefits of harmonized laws, legitimated extraterritorial reach, and increased bilateral cooperation, motivated states agree to
the constraints (albeit "soft" constraints) of the multilateral treaty. The
treaty may not be able to stop a strong state from acting in excess of the
multilateral framework, but the framework can still influence the motivated
state's behavior. For most states, a decision to violate international law-or
to risk operating in a gray zone of legality where one could be perceived as
violating international law-is an informed decision; even when they choose

143. In addition to Article 46 of UNCAC, see note 140, supra, consider the additional forms of cooperation that the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention encourages states to formalize through bilateral agreements. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances art. 9, openedfor
signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164.
144. See, e.g., Model Laws and Treaties, UN OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME [UNODC], http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal-tools/model-treaties-and-laws.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); The Legal
Library on Drug Control, UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/enl/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
145. See Blum, supra note 104, at 372.
146. Cf id. at 360 (particularly in the context of security issues like extradition and intelligence
sharing, bilateral treaties "allow countries to accommodate their specific interests and strike the right
balance between national and international considerations. Uniformity in such cases would be neither
desirable nor efficient."). For an example of a failed attempt to negotiate specific enforcement cooperation
multilaterally instead of bilaterally, see the discussion in Part IV.A., infra, regarding the 2005 Protocol
to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention.
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because the desired outcome is
to act despite international law, they do so 147
worth the international and domestic costs.
In particular, from either a rationalist or a constructivist perspective of
state behavior, reputations for abiding by international law matter. A state's
decision to act contrary to international law can make it harder for the state
to make credible commitments in the future, 148 and it may bring social
opprobrium from allies-opprobrium internalized in particular by the officials who set and execute foreign policy. 149 Further, in liberal democracies,
leaders are responsive to the public, and publics often care whether their
country is perceived as law-abiding. 150 Consider the U.S. policies of targeted
killings, renditions, and indefinite detention: all are of questionable legality
under international law, but because of the aura of illegality, they are controversial domestically as well as internationally, and their use remains limited relative to U.S. capacity. As a particularly powerful state, the United
States can choose to violate international law, but international law still sets
the parameters of the conversation.
When a powerful state buys into a regime of channeled unilateralism, it
accepts the resulting shift in conversation: some courses of action become
more legal, others-by implication-less so. And where that line is drawn
is not entirely up to the stronger states, as multilateral negotiations will
always involve some concessions. 5 ' In exchange for greater legitimacy for
the bulk of the motivated state's actions, then, the motivated state will accept some compromises on the scope of legitimated action, as well as soft
constraints on its ability to pursue actions beyond that legitimated scope.
In sum, the multilateral treaty helps motivated states expand their extraterritorial efforts by harmonizing laws across states, endorsing broad prescriptive jurisdiction, and supporting greater bilateral cooperation. The
resulting increase in unilateral efforts can help narrow the enforcement gap
in the short term by reaching more transnational crime. Still, some gap will
remain as long as limited, lagging and reluctant states lack capacity or will
to fulfill their treaty obligations to enforce the criminal norm.

147. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 20, at 342 (noting that few unilateral decisions "are taken by a
state in complete isolation-usually, a state must at least consider the views of other states and how they
will react").
148. See, e.g., Brewster, Reputation, supra note 133, at 540-41; Guzman, supra note 14, at 1823,
1849-50.
149. See, e.g., von Stein, supra note 11, at 489.
150. Cf Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S151 (noting that international legalization leverages the
normative weight of the international legal system).
151. On the inevitability of compromise generally, see CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 7 (with
international treaty-making, "not even the strongest state will be able to achieve all of its objectives, and
some participants may have to settle for much less."). For an example of such compromise, consider the
negotiations of the Drug Trafficking Convention discussed in Part II.B, infra.
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C.

Stage 3: Building Compliance with the Multilateral Regime

The third stage of channeled unilateralism initiates a self-reinforcing cycle that may extend over years, if not decades. With this longer time horizon, the preferences of states can no longer be presumed static, providing
space for more normative mechanisms of compliance to shape states' behavior. The compliance literature has already examined how multilateral treaties can promote compliance from both rationalist and constructivist
perspectives,' 5 2 in particular the importance of increasing available information, generating repeated interactions, and channeling technical assistance. 153 Less studied is how these same effects can be generated by
54
unilateral actions in the service of a multilateral regime.
Consider first the predicted effects of multilateral treaties. Rationalist
theories of state behavior treat states as rational actors who use international
law to further their interests,"' although what constitutes the state's interests can be broadly defined. 15 6 From this perspective, multilateral treaties
will improve the quantity and quality of information available to states, in
particular due to secretariats and review mechanisms that collect data on
states' conduct. This improved information increases transparency into degrees of compliance and thus states' reliability regarding treaty commitments. 1 Multilateral regimes also promote repeated interactions among
states through review mechanisms, conferences, and plenary sessions. 158
More information and repeated interactions in turn diminish incentives to
cheat: states will more likely be exposed for failing to keep their commitments, leaving them with weakened reputations when offering to make new
commitments in the future. 15 9 Other scholars emphasize the transnational
networks fostered by treaties, through which sub-state actors interact and
develop relationships that serve as conduits for exchanging information and
providing technical assistance. 60 These inputs are then filtered by the substate actors back up through domestic structures to influence state behavior
6
from the inside out.' '
152. For an overview of the differences between rationalist and constructivist perspectives, see generally Hathaway, supra note 26.
153. See, e.g., Bach & Newman, supra note 86, at 522 (identifying how the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) fosters these effects in the context of securities reform).
154. For a notable exception, seeCleveland, supra note 18.
155. Robert O. Keohane, InternationalRelationsand InternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J.
487, 488 (1997).
156. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1944 (listing as potential state interests "improving . . .
reputation, enhancing . . . geopolitical power, furthering . . . ideological ends, avoiding conflict, or
avoiding sanction by a more powerful state").
157. See KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 94; Katzenstein et al., supra note 26, at 662.
158. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Tsrough Formal InternationalOrganizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 10, 17 (1998).
159. See KEOHANE, supra note 12, at 97, 101.
160. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 3-4 (2004); Raustiala, supra note
16, at 5-7, 27.
161. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 160, at 24-25.
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Constructivist accounts of state behavior instead explain states' compliance with international law by emphasizing the spread of norms through
processes of persuasion and socialization. 162 From this perspective, the repeated interactions fostered by multilateral forums promote discourse
through which norms are developed and nonconforming states are persuaded
to internalize them. 16 Meanwhile, the information generated by treaty regimes increases transparency into state actions, thereby enabling socialization, or the shaping of state behavior through the approval or opprobrium of
other states and nonstate actors. 164 Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes'
managerial model predicts that multilateral forums will promote compliance in part by building states' practical capacity to comply. 65 And Professor Harold Koh's transnational legal process model points to the norms
generated by repeated interactions in multilateral forums that sub-state and
66
private actors then carry back home and promote from within the state.'
Whether one gives more weight to rationalist or constructivist accounts
of state behavior, increased unilateralism within the context of a multilateral
regime may have similar effects. First, motivated states' investigations of
extraterritorial misconduct will increase available information about the
transnational criminal problem and generate possible solutions that other
states can mimic. 1 67 They also shed light on other states'-particularly lagging states'-lack of enforcement effort. When a motivated state investigates transnational criminal activity that another state party with stronger
jurisdictional ties has ignored despite its treaty obligations, the motivated
state increases the reputational cost of the other state's noncompliance, both
in terms of rational credibility and normative social standing. In addition,
domestic constituencies may increase internal pressure for reform once their
state's inaction has been juxtaposed against the action of the motivated
68
state. 1
162. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 26, at 902, 905, 915.
163. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 112, at 338; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 635-37 (2004).
164. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 26, at 902; see also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 163, at 645
(discussing "acculturation").
165. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 13-15, 197-201.
166. See Koh, supra note 15, at 2602, 2655.
167. See Kevin E. Davis et al., TransnationalAnti-Corruption Law in Action: Cases from Argentina and
Brazil 10 (N.Y.U. School of Law Int'l L. & Just. Working Paper 2014/1, Apr. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.iilj.org/documents/IILJGALWP12014.pdf (noting "demonstration effects" of transnational
bribery cases); Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 20, at 33 (noting states' mimicry of complex environmental laws); cf Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The InternationalDiffusion of Liberalism, 60 INT'L ORG.
781, 795-96 (2006) (summarizing literature on policy diffusion through processes of learning from other
state's experiences).
168. The best known example of this dynamic is the U.S. investigation of the British company BAE
for transnational bribery, discussed in Part I11A., infra. See also Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L.
Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritorialityand the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery
Legislation, 65 INT'L ORG. 745, 746, 750 (2011) (noting that extraterritorial cases can alter the political
economy of the target state, particularly by increasing the salience of the issue and by serving as a
"political resource" for those working domestically to increase enforcement); Davis et al., supra note 167,
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The motivated state's aggressive enforcement efforts can also have informational effects beyond highlighting other states' inaction: For example,
increased enforcement can signal to other countries that the motivated state
will remain committed to the regime, which can reassure those countries
that enforcing their own laws will not put them at a disadvantage. 169 And
motivated states' investigations of foreign firms can cause those firms to
press for reform back home; once multinational firms alter their internal
policies to align with the motivated state's heightened standards, they stand
to benefit from similar restrictions being imposed on their domestic competitors. 170 These reputational, signaling and domestic effects should be
most pronounced in lagging states that already share the normative commitment and the capacity to suppress the transnational crime but have not yet
invested the resources to do so.
Second, the bilateral enforcement agreements pursued by the motivated
state should lead to repeated interactions among sub-state actors. These interactions start during the course of negotiations and continue through the
agreement's formal channels of cooperation. 17' For example, the agreements
may establish points of contact for information sharing; arrange for the
secondment of military or law enforcement officials; or lay the groundwork
for joint training operations. 172 And repeated cooperation on investigations
under the auspices of these agreements can lead to more informal peer-topeer relationships as well, 173 resulting in more efficient cooperation as well
as the potential development of a shared ethic. 174 Shifts in the practice and
beliefs of domestic institutions due to such partnerships can in turn improve
at 10, 50 (noting similar effect in Argentina); Elizabeth K. Spahn, MultijurisdictionalBribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Spahn, Multijurisdictional] (noting similar effect in Indonesia).
169. See Tarullo, supra note 114, at 694 (discussing assurance games in the context of the OECD
Bribery Convention); see also Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT'L ORG. 459, 484 (2009) (noting how the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by U.S. courts informs other states and private actors of U.S. priorities and capabilities).
170. See Magnuson, supra note 86, at 407-08 (discussing this effect in the context of transnational
bribery); see also Bradford, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing this effect more generally in context of European
Union regulations); cf Simmons, supra note 167, at 794 (summarizing literature on policy diffusion
caused by states' competition for firms and investment).
171. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 167, at 798 ("It is well documented in the international literature
that the process of negotiating and maintaining institutional affiliations may create opportunities to
learn and persuade.").
172. See, for example, the discussion of maritime boarding agreements in Part III.B., infra.
173. See Frediric Lemieux, Tackling TransnationalDrug Trafficking Effectively: Assessing the Outcomes ofthe
Drug Enforcement Administration's InternationalCooperation Initiatives, in INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION: EMERGING ISSUES, THEORY AND PRACTICE 260, 264 (Fr6diric Lemieux ed., 2010) ("Exchanging
information -gathered during criminal investigations establishes networks and links between police professionals, but it also goes a long way to building trust (with reciprocity and communication).").
174. See Goldsmith et al., supra note 31, at 78-79. That such an ethic is likely to emerge does not
mean that it will always be a normatively desirable one; that depends in part on the internalization of
human rights and transparent governance norms, as well as the critical monitoring work of civil society.
Cf id. at 105-06 (concluding that transnational support for Colombian policing has improved accountability and human rights awareness but also encouraged the continued militarization of the national police
and its independence from civilian oversight).
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the state's overall compliance with treaty obligations. 1 5 Finally, particularly
where these bilateral agreements are employed between states with differing
resources, they can be conduits for technical knowledge and assistance-or
even more simply, learning-by-doing-that can help limited states achieve
176
their own enforcement priorities.
These observations are subject to important caveats, however. Although
there is some evidence of these third-stage dynamics in practice, causation is
difficult to prove in such complex contexts. The discussion here is thus preliminary and necessarily tentative. Further, the potential impact of power
disparity is greatest at this third stage, with the motivated state conducting
investigations and pushing bilateral cooperation that may be contrary to the
interests of affected states; such concerns are explored further in Part IV. The
insight here is simply that channeled unilateral efforts, like multilateral forums, can generate more information, peer-to-peer encounters, and technical
assistance. These effects should in turn help build broader compliance with
the underlying treaty regime, whether through normative diffusion, improved capacity, or reputational leverage. And as more states undertake independent efforts to suppress transnational crime, they will amplify the
combined effects of multilateralism and unilateralism on the remaining
noncompliant states. In the long run, no one state should need to champion
the multilateral regime because most (even if not all) states will be engaged
in the formation and enforcement of transnational criminal law.
III.

CHANNELED UNILATERALISM IN PRACTICE

This Part maps the theory to practice by identifying the dynamics of
channeled unilateralism at work in the transnational bribery and drug trafficking regimes. Though the fit between theory and practice is not always
perfect, these case studies support the plausibility of the model as a viable
path for narrowing the enforcement gap in transnational criminal law.

175. See id. at 105-06 (following close cooperation with U.S. law enforcement, "Colombian laws now
more fully reflect international standards in respect of areas such as anti-money laundering measures,
extradition and criminal procedure, though their implementation is imperfect and inadequate according
to many foreign assessments. Nonetheless, a substantial degree of harmonization has taken place."); cf.
Bach & Newman, supra note , at 514 (finding, in the absence of a multilateral framework, that a state
with a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was four times more
likely to adopt insider trading laws than states without one).
176. See Bach & Newman, supra note 86, at 510, 521 (summarizing literature on transgovernmenral
cooperation and applying it in the context of securities regulation); Davis et al., supra note 167, at 10,
58-59 (noting benefits of transnational corruption investigations in developing domestic enforcement
capacity).
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A.

TransnationalBribery

Between 1996 and 2003, five international organizations adopted suppression treaties targeting the bribery of foreign officials. 177 Nearly every
state has joined at least one of these treaties,'178 yet observers have worried
that they are only paper tigers: 179 States have been slow to adopt laws implementing the treaties, and even with laws in place, states seemed reluctant to
enforce those laws in any meaningful manner.18 0
But the tide may be turning. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) convention's forty-one states parties, for example,
have all adopted domestic implementing legislation.' 8 Given that these
states account for "nearly 90 percent of global outward flows of foreign direct investment," their companies are the prime supply-side target for the
suppression of transnational bribery.' 8 2 And enforcement is also increasing.
Ten years ago, only one state (Canada) other than the United States had
initiated a prosecution for foreign bribery; 83 today, at least seventeen members of the OECD convention have criminally sanctioned individuals and
companies for transnational bribery, and twenty-four states report investiga-

177. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724 [hereinafter OAS Convention]; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, openedfor signature Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD
Convention]; Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, opened for signatureJuly 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter African Union Convention]; UNCAC, supra note 134.
178. Only fourteen U.N. member states have not joined a transnational bribery treaty. Of the twenty
or so states that have not ratified UNCAC, New Zealand and Japan are parties to the OECD Convention;
Gambia is party to the African Union Convention; and Belize, Grenada, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint
Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname are parties to the OAS Convention. See United Nations Convention Against CorruptionSignature and Ratification Status, UNODC (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html; Ratification Status, OECD (May 21, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf; Advisory Board on Corruption, AFRICAN UNION, http://
www.auanticorruption.org/auac/en (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); Dep't of Int'l Law, Signatoriesand Ratifications, ORG. OF AM. STATES [OAS), http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html (last visited Apr.
7, 2015).
179. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 114, at 666, 682.
180. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate
Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 245, 309 (2010) [hereinafter Brewster, Stepping Stone) (suggesting that "[clompliance with the OECD treaty is lacking because governments see an advantage to
cheating on the agreement"); Magnuson, supra note 86, at 388 (asserting that the OECD Convention
"has suffered from severe under-enforcement by its member-states").
181. Nonetheless, improvements could be made to many of these laws, which is the topic of ongoing
discussion between the OECD and member states. See, e.g., OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 2
Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the Russian Federation 95 (Oct. 2013), available
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/RussianFederationPhase2ReportEN.pdf (recommending amendments to Russia's anti-bribery laws).
182. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Annual Report on Activities Undertaken in 2012, at 7 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep20l2.pdf [hereinafter OECD Annual Report
2013).
183. Magnuson, supra note 86, at 392-93.
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tions in progress. 18 4 Indeed, countries actively enforcing their transnational
bribery laws now account for nearly eighty percent of the world's exports. I85
Meanwhile, more major economies are adopting or strengthening transnational bribery laws: the United Kingdom significantly reformed its bribery
laws in 2010,186 China and Russia both adopted their first laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials in 2011,187 and China has started prosecuting multinational corporations for bribery. 188 Channeled unilateralism
can help explain both the sudden flurry of multilateral activity in the 1990s,
as well as this more recent trend towards broader enforcement of transnational bribery laws.
Recall that the first stage of channeled unilateralism occurs when many
states recognize an instrumental benefit to joining a multilateral regime.
The United States had long viewed an anti-bribery convention as in its best
interest. 18 9 The U.S. Congress had unanimously adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 following overseas bribery scandals that
Congress feared had tarnished the foreign policy and economic reputation of
the United States. 9° But the United States remained alone in the world for
nearly twenty years in prohibiting its domestic corporations from bribing
foreign officials.' 9' U.S. businesses complained that they were left at a competitive disadvantage against foreign firms; if they could not reverse the
FCPA domestically, they at least wanted an international standard that
would impose similar restrictions on their foreign competitors. 92 However,
U.S. efforts to secure such an international agreement in the 1980s came up
short.
What changed in the 1990s? Many factors were likely at play. First, following a wave of democratization around the world, new regimes recog184. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Annual Report of the OECD Working Group on Bribery 2014, at
15 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-AB-AnnRep-2014-EN.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Annual Report 2014].
185. Id. at 9.
186. F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer, & Michael S. Diamant, The British Are Coming!: Britain
Changes its Law on Foreign Bribery andJoinsthe InternationalFight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1,
6 (2010).
187. OECD Annual Report 2013, supra note 182, at 24; OECD Invites Russia to Join Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD (May 25, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/oecdinvires
mssiatojoinanti-briberyconvention.htm.
188. See Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, Glaxo Fined $500 Million by China, N.Y. TIMES BI (Sept.
20, 2014) (describing $500 million fine imposed on British multinational GlaxoSmithKline for admitted bribery scheme in China that generated more than $150 million in illegal revenue).
189. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Why Does the United States Regulate ForeignBribery: Moralism, Self-Interest,
or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 502 (2012) (citing Congress's direction to the President to negotiate an OECD anti-bribery convention as part of the 1988 FCPA amendments); Tarullo,
supra note 114, at 671-75.
190. See Davis, supra note 189, at 498-501; Tarullo, supra note 114, at 673.
191. See Brewster, Stepping Stone, supra note 180, at 309; Tarullo, supra note 114, at 673.
192. See, e.g., Brewster, Stepping Stone, supra note 180, at 307-08; Tarullo, supra note 114, at 675; see
also William J. Clinton, Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 (Nov. 10, 1998), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpaldocs/signing.pdf (noting
U.S. business losses to unconstrained foreign competitors as motivation for OECD bribery convention).
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nized-and objected to-the harm caused by foreign corporations bribing
their officials. Not only did the Organization of American States (OAS)
adopt the first convention targeting transnational bribery, but pressure from
93
developing states was also a significant impetus for the OECD treaty.
Second, some high-profile bribery scandals in Europe, combined with a new
and particularly credible transnational advocacy network," 94 created domestic pressure in those states to do something about transnational corruption."95 For these countries, signing onto the transnational bribery
conventions was a relatively low cost way to illustrate their commitment to
the issue, even if they had little present intention of undertaking domestic
reform. 96 Finally, the new Clinton Administration in the United States prioritized transnational bribery enforcement within its foreign policy, linking
97
cooperation on this front to progress on other international trade issues.
Some states that were agnostic or even resistant to a transnational bribery
regime were thus induced to participate, at least nominally.98
In sum, whether due to domestic politics, lack of domestic capacity, or
linkage to other issues, states converged on a multilateral response to bribery
in the 1990s. The end result was a slew of treaties that states were quick to
adopt but slow to implement. In keeping with the second stage of channeled
unilateralism, however, the treaties provided space for increased unilateral
enforcement of transnational bribery prohibitions-an opportunity most enthusiastically embraced by the United States.
Upon ratification, the United States relied on the OECD convention to
expand significantly its claims of prescriptive jurisdiction. When Congress
first drafted the FCPA in 1977, the House considered extending the law to
any entity owned or controlled by U.S. nationals, including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. 199 This proposal was dropped in conference, however, based on the Senate's objection that it would push the limits of
international law, generating undesirable "jurisdictional, enforcement, and
' 20 0
diplomatic difficulties."
When amending the FCPA in 1998 to implement the OECD convention,
however, Congress felt empowered-perhaps even obligated-to expand the

193. See Tarullo, supra note 114, at 679.
194. Transparency International was founded by a former World Bank development expert in 1993;
it documents public perceptions of corruption around the world through well-publicized annual reports.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S165; see also Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Competition and Anticorruption Law, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 62 (2012) (noting the possible impact of "canny transnational norm
entrepreneurs" in "produc[ing] a widespread demand for anticorruption measures").
195. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S159; Tarullo, supra note 114, at 678-79.
196. See Tarullo, supra note 114, at 680.
197. See id at 676-77.
198. See id.
199. See H. Lowell Brown, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 239,
291-92 (2001) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4, 12 (1977)).
200. H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 13-14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
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FCPA's jurisdictional reach even further than the House had contemplated
in 1977.201 The OECD convention requires each state party "to establish its
jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in its territory, "'202 a provision intended to be
"interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery
act is not required. "' 20 3 Based on this admonition, 20 4 Congress extended U.S.
jurisdiction to cover any act related to foreign bribery that has any territorial
connection with the United States, regardless of the actor's nationality or the
location where the bribe was actually plotted or offered. 20 5 Thus any use of
the mails or the wires of the United States, including the flow of funds
through U.S. bank accounts or a phone call placed to a U.S. number, can
provide a jurisdictional hook for U.S. prosecution of foreign nationals for
conduct that occurs primarily overseas. 20 6 Congress also extended jurisdiction based on nationality to cover any conduct by U.S. nationals (including
20 7
businesses organized under U.S. law) anywhere in the world.
Since these amendments, FCPA enforcement has increased significantly,
peaking in 2010.208 Between 2006 and 2010, for example, U.S. prosecutors
brought more FCPA cases than they had in the prior two decades combined. 20 9 And many of these cases have targeted foreign actors for foreign
conduct; 210 in 2010 alone, "non-U.S. corporations accounted for 94% of the
211
total penalties paid by corporations for FCPA violations."
201. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REv. 1775, 1830 (2011).
202. OECD Convention, supra note 177, art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
203. OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions
25 (Nov. 21, 1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery.ENG.pdf.
204. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 21 (1998) (discussing § 4 of Pub. L. No. 105-366 as
implementing Article 4(1) of the OECD Bribery Convention).
205. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 4,
112 Stat. 3302, 3306 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3).
206. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REv. 489, 552-53 (2011) (collecting examples of tenuous
jurisdictional bases of recent FCPA cases).
207. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act § 2(c)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1)
(issuers); id.§ 3(d)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2) (domestic concerns).
208. See FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,
SHEARMAN & STERLING (Jan. 2015), http://shearman.symplicity.com/files/681/68116flefbbd626387809
4fb3lb31339.pdf.
209. Warin et al., supra note 186, at 69; see also Nicholas M. Mclean, Note, Cross-NationalPatterns in
FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970, 1972-73 (2012) (collecting sources).
210. Garrett, supra note 201, at 1832-33 (estimating that about a third of FCPA investigations
involve foreign business organizations).
211. Magnuson, supra note 86, at 400. These figures could suggest that the United States is using the
FCPA to protect U.S. business against foreign competitors, but that is not an entirely satisfactory explanation. One empirical analysis of FCPA cases, for example, found that the SEC and Department of Justice
did not target foreign companies in countries where U.S. firms do more business, as would be expected if
these agencies were motivated by protectionism. See Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, ForeignAffairs and
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct 43 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-15, Dec. 30,
2013), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116487; see also Stephan, supra note 194, at 65-67 (considering and rejecting hypothesis of protectionist bias in U.S. enforcement practice).
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These investigations have been aided by growing cooperation with other
states' law enforcement agencies. In particular, the United States has
benefitted from memoranda of understanding that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has established with securities regulators around
the world. 21 2 Although they are not legally binding, the memoranda are
phrased like MLATs and allow regulators to share information that can be
passed on to law enforcement officials investigating related crimes. 213 And
these memoranda have affirmatively eased U.S. efforts to conduct cross-border investigations: whether the United States pursues an FCPA investigation
in another country is correlated not to whether it has a generic MLAT with
that country, but with whether it has one of these memoranda of understanding in place. 21 4 Another study has found a more general correlation
between FCPA enforcement actions and whether the defendant's home state
"has a longstanding bilateral cooperation agreement with the SEC, a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S., and strong local anti-bribery
'21 5
institutions."
Still, the model of channeled unilateralism described in this Article contemplates more subject-specific and more in-depth forms of bilateral cooperation. One underutilized avenue is joint investigations based on Article 49
of U.N. Convention Against Corruption. 216 Joint investigations transcend
the mere coordination of parallel investigations; they are integrated law enforcement efforts that enable one state's officials to be present on another
state's territory to observe (even if not actively participate in) enforcement
activities like searches and witness interviews. European states, for example,
have successfully used joint investigations in transnational bribery cases, al27
beit under a framework established through the European Union. 1
Turning to the third stage of channeled unilateralism, there is mounting
evidence that the increased unilateral efforts of the United States have encouraged other states to update and enforce their own laws in conformity
with the transnational bribery treaties. 218 In one well-documented example,
212. See OECD Typology, supra note 79, at 69; Mclean, supra note 209, at 1988.
213. See OECD Typology, supra note 79, at 68-69. These individual MOUs have largely been replaced
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions' Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), now signed by 105 states. Current Signatories, IOSCO, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subSection=mmou&subSectionl=signatories (last visited Apr.7, 2015). In 2013 alone, the MMOU was
invoked in more than 2600 requests forinformation. About the MultilateralMemorandum of Understanding,
IOSCO, https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=mmou (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
214. See Mclean, supra note 209, at 2003.
215. See Choi & Davis, supra note 211, at 43.
216. A bilateral framework agreement established under Article 49 might address, inter alia, "disclosure and confidentiality obligations, data privacy issues, and privilege issues," OECD Typology, supra note
79, at 50, as well as evidentiary standards, cost sharing, division of confiscated goods, and liability issues,
id.at 54-55.
217. Id. at 51-55.
218. See Spahn, Multijurisdictional,supra note 168, at 41-42 ("Broader jurisdictional claims among
stronger enforcing states, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, have been used in practice
to strengthen, or pressure, depending on your politics, jurisdictions perceived as lagging, unable, or
unwilling to prosecute their own national champions."); Developments in the Law-Extraterritoriality,124
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the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted a case avoided by the British,
highlighting the United Kingdom's failure to pursue "one of the largest and
most extensive bribery schemes in history" 2 19 and sparking significant legal
reform.220 BAE, a British company, had obtained immensely lucrative contracts to sell airplanes to Saudi Arabia by funneling hundreds of millions of
dollars' worth of bribes to senior Saudi officials. 221 The United Kingdom
started an investigation into these allegations but dropped it due to pressure
from Saudi Arabia. 222 The United States then initiated its own investigation,
even though BAE was not a U.S. corporation and was not listed on a U.S.
exchange, and even though most of the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States. 223 In February 2010, BAE's U.S. subsidiary pled guilty to
224
a number of crimes and agreed to pay a $400 million fine.
Particularly in light of the high-profile U.S. investigation, the British
capitulation to Saudi pressure was a public relations disaster both at home
and abroad, and it spurred reform of the United Kingdom's outdated foreign
bribery laws. 225 The new law's coverage is even more far-reaching than the
FCPA; 226 the United Kingdom is now positioned to become another "motivated state," with its transnational enforcement efforts "prodding [additional] states that consider themselves international economic forces, such as
China, Japan, and other countries of the European Union, to ramp up their
anti-corruption efforts." 221 The British law is also causing firms that do business in the United Kingdom to update their internal compliance policies. 228
As these corporations shift their behavior and policies to align with the
strict British law, they may pressure their home governments to impose
similar requirements on their domestic competitors.
Similarly, the U.S. investigation of Daimler AG has been credited with
overcoming German prosecutors' resistance to enforcing foreign bribery
rules: since the Daimler investigation in 2004, "Germany has increased its
enforcement from 1 antibribery case and 12 investigations in 2005 to a total
of 117 cases and 150 investigations by 2009," including the coordinated
U.S.-German investigation of Siemens that resulted in a record-breaking
HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1287 (2011) ("[U]nilateral American enforcement of the OECD Convention's
anticorruption policy on a global scale has encouraged other convention signatories to observe the
treaty.").
219. Magnuson, supra note 86, at 363.
220. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 201, at 1840-42; Warin et al., supra note 186, at 3-5.
221. Garrett, supra note 201, at 1840; Warin et al., supra note 186, at 3.
222. Garrett, supra note 201, at 1831; Magnuson, supra note 86, at 363; Warin et al., supra note 186,
at 3.
223. Magnuson, supra note 86, at 403.
224. Garrett, supra note 201, at 1842. In the end, BAE's subsidiary did not plead guilty to any FCPA
violations, but instead acknowledged responsibility on other charges of wrongdoing stemming from the
bribery scheme. Id.
225. See Warin eral., supra note 186, at 3-5, 45.
226. See Spahn, Multijurisdictional,supra note 168, at 42; Warin er al., supra note 186, at 28.
227. Warin et al., supra note 186, at 70.
228. See id. at 8.
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$1.3 billion settlement.2 2 9 The German and U.S. investigation of Siemens in
turn created political pressure in Argentina to "revive the Argentine criminal proceedings that had stalled in the face of resistance from powerful local

actors."'2 30 Indonesia brought bribery charges against Indonesian citizens following investigations by British and American authorities and subsequent
pressure from Indonesian NGOs for domestic prosecutions. 23 Sweden
brought criminal charges against Volvo executives following a U.S. investigation, and Nigeria and South Korea have also pursued domestic investiga-

tions in parallel with U.S. cases.2 3 2 Indeed, an empirical analysis of
enforcement trends in OECD member states found that "U.S. enforcement
has a positive and statistically significant association with a country's likelihood of enforcing their own national laws." 233 "Holding all other variables
constant, the odds of a country enforcing its first case are twenty times greater

if a country has experienced extraterritorial application of the FCPA as compared to countries that have not. "234
Of course, these "unilateral" efforts are not taking place in a vacuum. 23 5
The transnational bribery treaties have their own informational, network,
and capacity-building effects that encourage compliance and amplify the
impact of the efforts of motivated states like the United States. The treaties'
review mechanisms-particularly that of the OECD convention-track the
status of domestic legislation and enforcement efforts, increasing transparency into states' compliance and fostering discourse through rounds of
recommendations and state responses. 23 6 These organizations have also published technical guides collecting best practices for reforming laws and con-

229. Kaczmarek & Newman, supra note 168, at 755.
230. Davis et al., supra note 167, at 50. A December 2013 indictment in the Argentine proceedings
"explicitly recognized that the investigation only seriously considered a bribery charge after receiving the
information from the US and Germany and, in fact, around 80% of the evidence used to support the
indictment was collected abroad." Id. Nonetheless, Argentina's domestic efforts have not yet come to full
fruition, and Argentina has seen little of the fines and forfeitures collected by the United States and
Germany. See id.at 27, 51.
231. See Spahn, Multijurisditional,supra note 168, at 39.
232. See id.at 27-30 (Nigeria); Developments inthe Law-Extraterritoriality,supra note 218, at 1288 &
n.73 (Sweden and South Korea).
233. Kaczmarek & Newman, supra note 168, at 760.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. But see Magnuson, supra note 86, at 376 (suggesting aggressive U.S. enforcement of the FCPA
can be "an effective alternative to multilateral cooperation").
236. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 26, at S173 (describing the OECD Working Group's review
process as employing both "the threat of exposure and criticism to ensure that national prosecutors
prosecute vigorously" and "discursive approaches to ensure that national legal bureaucracies internalize
and mobilize anticorruption values"); see also generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 13, at 26. The
OECD publishes these reviews online; UNCAC reports are also partially available online. See Country
Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/councrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); Country Profiles,
UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2015).
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ducting bilateral investigations, 237 and they routinely organize networking
opportunities that bring together law enforcement and corruption experts
from around the world. 23 In the end, the success of the transnational bribery
regime may be due not to the corruption conventions or to aggressive enforcement efforts by individual states, but rather to a combination of the
two.
B.

Drug Trafficking

International cooperation to control the drug trade dates back more than
a century. 23 9 But for most of that time, the major drug conventions were
focused on regulating the licit drug market; these were not law enforcement
treaties. 240 That changed in 1988 with the adoption of the UN Drug Trafficking Convention, which focuses almost exclusively on law enforcement
cooperation. 241 Although the United States' commitment to suppressing the
drug trade is notorious, the Convention is not solely an American project.
Rather, in the mid-1980s, in line with the first stage of channeled unilateralism, numerous states determined that greater cooperation and enforcement
242
against the escalating drug trade was in their common interest.
In the United States, domestic constituencies were demanding greater
drug enforcement, resulting in a dramatic increase in the scope and funding
of the War on Drugs in the 1980s. 243 Meanwhile, the U.S. Coast Guard
reported a significant uptick in maritime drug smuggling starting in the
1970s, particularly of marijuana through the Caribbean. 244 Already by 1978,
the Coast Guard had seized three hundred vessels and more than $2.4 bil237. See Prevention and Fight Against Corruption: Documents, Publications and Tools, UNODC, http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/publications.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (index of reports and
guides); Anti-Bribery Typology Reports, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberytypologyreports.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
238. See OECD Annual Report 2013, supra note 182, at 23, 30, 38; cf Raustiala, supra note 16, at 7, 27
(arguing that transnational networks, through technical assistance and capacity building, help promote
policy convergence and thus treaty compliance).
239. The first international convention regarding the drug trade was signed in 1912. See International
Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
240. The dozen or so preexisting conventions on drug control were merged and streamlined through
the aptly named Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, which regulates cannabis, opium, coca,
and additional narcotic drugs and currently has 154 states parties. See Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 44, openedfor
signature Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Treaty Status, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org (follow "Status of Treaties" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter VI" hyperlink; then
follow treaty hyperlink). Its regulatory regime was extended to cover hallucinogens, stimulants, and
sedatives by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T.
543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, which now has 183 states parties. Treaty Status, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org (follow "Status of Treaties" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter VI" hyperlink; then
follow treaty hyperlink).
241. See Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, openedfor
signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Drug Trafficking Convention].
242. See text accompanying notes 259-263.
243. See, e.g, Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
244. H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 3-4 (1979).
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lion of contraband. 245 Yet the United States was finding traditional methods
of state-to-state cooperation, like MLATs and informal arrangements, to be
inadequate to stem the flow of drugs, particularly in the maritime context. 246 The Coast Guard was also hampered by limited enforcement powers
against non-U.S. ships, and federal prosecutors were stymied by a statutory
those
loophole that made it difficult to convict any drug smugglers, even
247
waters.
territorial
U.S.
outside
seized
vessels,
U.S.-flagged
aboard
Congress tried to close that loophole in 1980 with the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act (MHSA). 248 The MHSA asserted prescriptive jurisdiction
over maritime drug smuggling within U.S. territorial and customs waters,
by U.S. nationals, on U.S.-flagged ships, on stateless vessels, or when the
contraband was destined for U.S. markets-all traditional bases for jurisdiction under international law. 249 Congress and the Administration worried,
however, about pushing jurisdictional claims too far, 250 in particular by extending the MHSA to reach conduct by foreign citizens on board foreignhad consented to the United States'
flagged vessels when the foreign 2state
1
boarding and searching the ship. "
In implementing the MHSA, the United States developed a practice of
securing informal, ad hoc consent from other states to search and seize their
flagged vessels suspected of drug trafficking. 25 2 The United Kingdom,
through an exchange of notes in 1981, gave blanket consent for the U.S.
Coast Guard to board ships flying the British flag or the flag of any of its
Caribbean dependencies. 2"3 But other states were unwilling to formalize
these arrangements, despite keen interest from Congress and the Executive
Branch to secure more systematic consent. 25 4 Negotiating such agreements
would also be a slow and difficult process, given all the issues the agree-

245. Id. at 4.
246. See SENATE CAUCUS ON INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL, REP. ON THE STATUS OF THE DRAFT
CONVENTION, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND ISSUES FOR THE SENATE 2 (Comm. Print 1987).
247. H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 4-5 (1979). A statute prohibiting the use of narcotics on board U.S.
vessels on the high seas was "inadvertently repealed" by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act in 1970. Id. at 4. As of 1977, "over 80 percent of U.S. citizens apprehended by the Coast
Guard for drug smuggling on the high seas were not being successfully prosecuted." Id. at 5.
248. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
249. Id.; see also Part II.A., supra.
250. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 7 (1979) ("Recognition of exclusive flag state jurisdiction as
the premise underlying the concept of freedom of the high seas compels the most circumspect and
judicious consideration before exercising any sovereign right of unilateral action.").
251. See id. at 16-17 (Department of Justice views); id. at 20 (Department of Transportation views).
The House amended the bill in response to these concerns. See id. at 9-10 (explaining that an amended
version "eliminates any possible conflict with international law by limiting the scope of the bill to
situations where the U.S. has clear jurisdiction" and describing those clear bases of jurisdiction under
international law).
252. See Defining Customs Waters for Certain Drug Offenses: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 35 (1985) [hereinafter Defining Customs Waters].
253. Narcotic Drugs: Interdiction of Vessels, Exchange of Notes, U.S.-U.K., Nov. 13, 1981, 33
U.S.T. 4224.
254. See Defining Customs Waters, supra note 252, at 61-62.
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ments would need to cover. 255 At the same time, U.S. courts were struggling
to find jurisdiction to prosecute the foreign nationals seized on foreign-flagged ships following ad hoc consent. By 1984, courts were interpreting the
MHSA's reference to "customs waters" to include the location of any foreign-flagged ship for which the United States had secured consent for
search.2 5 6 Although Congress considered amending the MHSA in 1985 to
adopt this interpretation more explicitly, this interpretation does not seem
to have been the original intention of the "customs water" provision in the
1980 law .2 57 A new multilateral treaty would provide explicit justification
for extending U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction to cover these consent-based
seizures, and it could also help the United States secure broader and more
formal cooperation with other states.
Meanwhile, drug producing and transit states shared many of the same
concerns as the United States and its European allies, 258 particularly regarding the links between drug trafficking and organized crime. 259 Venezuela
255. See id. at 61.
256. See United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v.
Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1549-51 (1 Ith Cit. 1985), abrogatedon other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). The MHSA asserted jurisdiction over any vessel "within the customs waters of
the United States" and cross-referenced 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) to define "customs waters." Marijuana on
the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, §§ 1-2, 94 Star. 1159, 1159-60 (1980). Section 1401(j) in turn
provides in full:
The term "customs waters" means, in the case of a foreign vessel subject to a treaty or other
arrangement between a foreign government and the United States enabling or permitting the
authorities of the United States to board, examine, search, seize, or otherwise to enforce upon
such vessel upon the high seas the laws of the United States, the waters within such distance of
the coast of the United States as the said authorities are or may be so enabled or permitted by
such treaty or arrangement and, in the case of every other vessel, the waters within four leagues
of the coast of the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1401(j). That is, the customs waters typically extended for twelve miles from the U.S. coast,
reflecting the U.S. understanding of customary international law prior to the 1988 Law of the Sea Convention. During Prohibition, the United States had entered into anti-smuggling agreements with other
countries like the United Kingdom to reach "hovering ships" that were within an hour's sailing time of
the U.S. coast, even if not technically within the twelve-mile limit; Congress amended the customs
jurisdiction to reflect those agreements. Defining Customs Waters, supra note 252, at 41. Courts in the
1980s, however, used the "treaty or other arrangement" language of § 1401(j) to extend U.S. customs
waters to reach any ship on the high seas for which the United States had been granted consent to search.
See, e.g., Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d at 157.
257. Compare H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 10 (1979) (describing § 955a(c) as "predicated upon the
assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over its Customs Zone by virtue of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, 1958 .... This section is intended to encompass all vessels and persons actually or
constructively present within the Customs waters [out to a distance of twelve nautical miles], thereby
incorporating by reference the accepted international law doctrine of hot pursuit and the domestic statutory provision governing hovering vessels .... "), with Defining Customs Waters, supra note 252, at 14 ("It
is my strong opinion that in 1980, when these words were put into the statute, that it was congressional
intent that [verbal consent for search) was an arrangement [for purposes of § 1401(j)].").
258. See, e.g., FRIEDRICHS, supra note 79, at 161-68 (describing the anti-drug trafficking efforts of
Germany and France in the 1970s and 1980s).
259. See, e.g., ASEAN Foreign Ministers Joint Statement on the International Problem of Drug Abuse
and Trafficking (July 9, 1985), hrtp://www.asean.org/communicies/asean-political-security-community/
item/asean-foreign-ministers-joint-satement-on-the-international-problem-of-drug-abuse-and-traffick-
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introduced the U.N. General Assembly resolution that initially called for a
drug trafficking convention, which was adopted unanimously in 1984.260
This resolution followed two formal declarations by Latin American states
urging an increased multilateral response and arguing that drug trafficking
be labeled a crime against humanity. 261 Caribbean states in particular were
worried about the negative externalities caused by the drugs being trafficked
through their waters, yet they lacked the resources to counter the rising
tide. 262 These concerns ultimately led Trinidad and Tobago, with the support of its regional allies, to call for an international criminal court that
263
could help enforce the Drug Trafficking Convention.
While there was widespread international support for a drug trafficking
convention, its negotiation was not without tension. The final product represents a compromise between, loosely speaking, drug producing states like
Mexico and drug consuming states like the United States. 264 While the
consumer states wanted the convention to focus on eradicating the crossborder trade in drugs, Mexico and other producing states insisted the convention also recognize the demand side of the problem: the market for illicit
drugs in rich, western countries. 265 Mexico and other Latin American states
also worried that the United States would use the convention to interfere in
producing and transit states 266-a not outlandish concern given the U.S.
invasion of Panama in 1989. Drug producing and transit states did obtain
some concessions in the final convention, such as Article 2's general affirma-

ing-kuala-lumpur-9-july-1985. Of course, the United States may have influenced these changing views
of other states, see Part IV.A., infra.

260. William C. Gilmore, Drug Trafficking by Sea: The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 15 MARINE POL'Y 183, 183 (1991).
261. See U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES,

6, U.N. Doc. El

CN.7/590, U.N. Sales No. E.98.XI.5 (1998) (noting the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs, signed in 1984 by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela; and the
New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs, also signed in 1984 by
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).
262. See generally Baytoram Ramharack, Cooperation in Narco-Trafficking: The United States and the English-Speaking Caribbean, 46 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 83 (1997) (discussing U.S.-Caribbean cooperation on
drug trafficking efforts in the 1980s and 1990s).
263. See Draft Resolution, supra note 101 (proposal submitted by sixteen Latin American and island
nations (plus Libya) calling for an international criminal court that could prosecute transnational drug
traffickers; asserting "the established link between the illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and other
organized criminal activities which endanger the constitutional order of States and violate basic human
rights"; and noting the recent adoption of the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention); see also Permanent
Rep. of Trinidad & Tobago to the U.N., Letter addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/44/195
(Aug. 21, 1989) (explaining the need for an international criminal court to help effectuate the new U.N.
Drug Trafficking Convention). This interest in a supranational enforcement body in part reflected wariness of aggressive unilateral enforcement by the United States; Caribbean states in particular have walked
a fine line in managing U.S. zeal in countering drug trafficking.
264. See D.W. Sproule & Paul St. Denis, The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step, 27
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 266 (1989).
265. Id. at 266 & n.18
266. Id.at 267 n.18.
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tion of state sovereignty, 267 the inclusion of personal possession as a crime to
be penalized by member states, 268 and a weaker role for the International
Narcotics Control Board in naming and shaming states deemed noncomp269
liant with the regime-typically the producing states.
The resulting treaty has now been ratified by all but seven countries. 270 In
keeping with the second stage of channeled unilateralism, the treaty has
encouraged transnational enforcement by motivated states by affirming a
broad scope of prescriptive jurisdiction and calling for bilateral agreements
on enforcement cooperation.
The Drug Trafficking Convention's jurisdictional provision explicitly
permits states to apply their laws to conduct on board foreign-flagged ships
as long as the two states have a ship-boarding agreement in place. 271 This
resolved any remaining qualms the United States might have had about
asserting jurisdiction based solely on consent. In 1986, as the core provisions
272
of the Drug Trafficking Convention were being circulated for comment,
Congress adopted this broader jurisdictional basis in the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).27 3 Perhaps the draft Convention was the
final justification the United States needed, or perhaps shifting U.S. practice
informed the draft Convention. Regardless, the emerging multilateral consensus that such jurisdictional claims were legitimate under international
law eased U.S. reform and made it more difficult for other states to object to
27 4
the expanded U.S. law.
The Convention also invited greater bilateral enforcement cooperation. It
rejects bank secrecy laws as an excuse to deny cross-border confiscation requests 275 and encourages the use of controlled delivery, 276 both of which had

267. See id.Article 2 provides that "[t]he Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and
that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States." Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note
241, art. 2(2).
268. Sproule & St. Denis, supra note 264, at 269. Ironically, Mexico may be in violation of the
convention because of its recent decriminalization of marijuana possession. See BoLSTER, supra note 7, at
59 (citing INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REP. OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

BOARD FOR 2009,
408, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2009/1, U.N. Sales No. E.10.XI.1 (2010)).
269. See Sproule & St. Denis, supra note 264, at 288, 290.
270. The exceptions are Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Palau, Papa New Guinea, the Solomon Islands,
South Sudan, and Tuvalu. See Treaty Status, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://rreaties.un.org (follow
"Status of Treaties" hyperlink; then follow "Chapter VI" hyperlink; then follow treaty hyperlink); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, I InternationalNarcot-

icsControl Strategy Report 28-31 (2013), available at hrtp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
204265.pdf.
271. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 241, art. 4(1)(b)(ii).
272. Gilmore, supra note 260, at 183-84.
273. See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Prosecution Improvements Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99950, § 3202, 100 Stat. 3207-95 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(C)).
274. For one thing, other states parties to the treaty cannot object to the U.S. exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction that is affirmatively sanctioned by the treaty. See BOiSTER, supra note 7, at 137-38.
275. See Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 241, arts. 5 & 7(5).
276. See id.art. 11.
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been stumbling blocks in earlier transnational investigations.2 7 7 The Convention further calls on states to enter into supplemental bilateral or regional agreements on topics like extradition, the transfer of prisoners,
mutual legal assistance, information sharing, joint investigation teams, the
placement of liaison officers, and maritime interdictions. 278 Some of these
provisions suggest specific content that can serve as a starting point for bi279
lateral negotiations.
States have heeded this call for supplemental bilateral agreements. Canada, for example, has a series of bilateral agreements regarding forfeiture of
drug trafficking assets. 280 Argentina has concluded bilateral agreements regarding technical cooperation in treating drug addiction, eradicating drug
cultivation, and suppressing illicit trafficking and money laundering. 281 And
the European Union has concluded nearly a dozen bilateral agreements on
282
controlling drug precursors.
Most significant, however, are the ship-boarding agreements described in
Article 17 of the Drug Trafficking Convention. The United States has been
the greatest user of Article 17, with forty-five maritime boarding agreements now in place. 283 A few other states have followed suit,28 4 and two
regional Article 17 agreements are also now in force: one in Europe 285 and
the other in the Caribbean. 286 Although the United States applied signifi277. Controlled delivery was a controversial law enforcement tactic within some legal systems, and
bank secrecy laws had been a significant hurdle in money laundering investigations and asset forfeiture
proceedings. SeeSproule & St. Denis, supra note 264, at 281-82, 287. Both of these provisions were
victories for the United States during negotiations, as it had long championed controlled delivery and the
repeal of bank secrecy laws as law enforcement tools.
278. See Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 241, arts. 6, 7, 9(1), 17.
279. See id. art. 6 (extradition); art. 7 (MLATs); art. 17 (maritime interdiction).
280. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding the Sharing of Forfeited or Confiscated Assets and Equivalent
Funds, Can.-Ant. & Barb., Oct. 14, 1999, 1999 Can. T.S. No. 36.
281. See, e.g., Convention on the Abuse and Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics, Arg.-Bol., Apr. 18, 1991,
Law No. 23.933, available at http://www.oas.org/Juridico/mla/sp/traites/sp-arg-bol-23933.html.
282. See Eur. Comm'n Press Release, Fight Against Illicit Drugs: EU Signs New Agreement with
Russia (June 4, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-13-499-en.htm.
283. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS & LAw ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 1
InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report 49 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf.
284. See, e.g., Treaty to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking at Sea, Spain-It., Mar. 23, 1990, 1776
U.N.T.S. 229; Treaty to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking at Sea, Spain-Port., Mar. 2, 1998, 2149
U.N.T.S. 3. According to reports collected from seventy-four countries in 2011, about a dozen states
affirmatively reported that they had entered into bilateral or regional agreements under Article 17. See
Exec. Dir. of Comm'n on Narcotic Drugs, Action Taken by Member States to Implement the PoliticalDeclaration and Plan of Action on InternationalCooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the
World Drug Problem, 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/2012/14 (Feb. 3, 2012).
285. Council of Europe Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, Implementing Article 17 of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 156 [hereinafter Council of Europe Agreement]. The Agreement
has fifteen states parties and has been in force since 2000. See Treaty Status, COUNCIL OF EUR. TREATY
OFFICE,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT =156&CM = I&DF =&CL=
ENG (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
286. Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, openedfor signature Apr. 10, 2003, Mari-
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cant pressure on many Caribbean countries to sign maritime boarding agreements, 2 7 the variation among these agreements suggests that they reflect, at
least to some degree, the particular concerns and priorities of each state. 288
For example, the agreements differ as to whether the flag state's consent to9
28
board its flagged vessel must be expressly obtained in each instance,
whether consent is assumed if the flag state does not respond to a request
within a certain number of hours, 290 or whether consent is automatically
granted under the agreement. 291 Similarly, some agreements allow the
United States to enter the territorial waters of the other state in certain
instances, 292 while others prohibit any entry into territorial waters without
293
express authorization.
In sum, states are using the background consensus of the Drug Trafficking Convention to contract around the traditional limits on extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction. And as the United States in particular has used
these bilateral agreements to expand its enforcement efforts, it may also have
broader effects in line with the third stage of channeled unilateralism. The
United States has provided economic and technical assistance, training, and
equipment to many of its maritime partners, 294 the groundwork for which is
set by the maritime boarding agreements. 295 In addition, many (but not all)
of the maritime boarding agreements provide for "ship riders," law enforcement personnel stationed on the other state's government vessels who can
time and air counter narcotics agreement in Caribbean, 2005 DIGEST § 21 [hereinafter San Jose
Agreement], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87198.htm. The Agreement has eight states parties (including the United States) and has been in force since 2008. See Treaty Database, Gov'T OF THE
NETH., MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.minbuza.n/en/key-topics/treaties/search-thetreaty-database/2003/4/010467.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
287. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lehrman, Note, Enhancing the ProliferationSecurity Initiative: The Casefor a
DecentralizedNonproliferation Architecture, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 223, 237 (2004) (noting as an example of
U.S. pressure the Foreign Aviation Administration's downgrading of Barbados's airport when Barbados
initially declined to sign an Article 17 agreement).
288. Cf Ramharack, supra note 262, at 101 (describing the Bahamas as more receptive to entering
into an Article 17 agreement with the United States than Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica,
which were more concerned about aggressive U.S. law enforcement tactics).
289. Council of Europe Agreement, supra note 285, arts. 6-7.
290. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea and Air, U.S.Nicar., art. 9(1), June 1, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13153 [hereinafter U.S.-Nicaragua Agreement] (two-hour
time limit); Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, U.S.Jam., art. 14, May 6, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 98-310 (three-hour time limit); Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by Sea, U.S.-Malta, art.
5(3)(d), June 16, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 08-110 [hereinafter U.S-Malta Agreement] (four-hour time limit).
291. Agreement Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, art. 11, Mar.
4, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 12732 [hereinafter U.S.-Trinidad & Tobago Agreement].
292. See id. art. 8.
293. Agreement Concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by Sea, U.S.-Cook Islands, art. 4, Nov. 8, 2007, T.I.A.S. No. 07-1108 [hereinafter
U.S.-Cook Islands Agreement].
294. See, e.g., 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, supra note 283, at 34-39, 42-43.
295. See, e.g., U.S.-Nicaragua Agreement, supra note 290, art. 13; Agreement Concerning Operational
Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Transnational Maritime Activity, U.S.-Nauru, art. 13, Sept. 8, 2011,
T.I.A.S. No. 11908.
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authorize ship boardings or entry into territorial waters. 296 These programs
require routine integration of government representatives on board coast
guard vessels, providing another channel for transferring technical knowledge and developing professional networks.
In the end, it is difficult to measure the impact of law enforcement efforts
on a problem as large and complex as the global drug trade, and U.S. aid in
the War on Drugs is often a double-edged sword. There are, however, indications that the enforcement gap is narrowing for drug traffickers in general.
Global seizures of cocaine, heroin, morphine, and cannabis nearly doubled
297
between 1998 and 2009, and seizures of stimulants more than tripled.
This increase in seizures cannot be explained by an increase in supply: the
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime concluded in 2007 that the overall production of drugs had stabilized; as a result, "the share of total drug production
that is seized by law enforcement ha[d] ...increased" significantly since
2000, with close to half of global cocaine production and a quarter of global
heroin production never reaching consumers. 298 Today, the majority of cocaine seizures are made by South American, Central American, and Caribbean states; Colombia has seized more cocaine than the United States every
year since 2007.299 The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime has credited this
interdiction success to "[ilmproved cooperation among law enforcement
bodies in and across countries."300
IV.

THE QUESTION OF POWER

As these case studies suggest, channeled unilateralism has the effect of
legitimating strong states' unilateral acts and structuring interstate cooperation to support those efforts. Channeled unilateralism looks even more unilateral and less channeled when we consider that strong states like the
United States typically set the agenda, shape the norms, and obtain many of
the benefits of increased cooperation over transnational crime. It thus would
not be difficult to critique the model developed here as an apology for U.S.
hegemony, or more generally for the continuing power imbalance in international relations.
This Part acknowledges these limitations. It attempts, however, to complicate that critique by suggesting how other states benefit, too. Given the
296. E.g., U.S.-Trinidad & Tobago Agreement, supra note 291, art. 8.
297. UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2011, at 15, U.N. Sales No. E.1l.XI.10 (2011), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR201 i/World DrugReport_201 Lebook.pdf.
298. UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2007, at 7, 12, U.N. Sales No. E.07.XI.5 (2007), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07fWDR_2007.pdf. More recently, opium poppy cultivation has
rebounded in Afghanistan due to regional instability, but coca bush cultivation has continued to decline
and is now at its lowest levels since 1990. UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, at 21, 35, U.N. Sales
No. E.14.XI.7 (2014), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World-Drug-Report2014_web.pdf.
299. See UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2014, at 34 fig. 31.
300. UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2007, at 7, 12.
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reality of power disparities and the importance of addressing transnational
crime, channeled unilateralism may be the best practical solution to the
enforcement gap. Further, channeled unilateralism does not depend on the
involvement of a hegemon; the Part thus concludes by exploring the role of
channeled unilateralism in a multipolar world.
A.

Setting Agendas

In developing a model of channeled unilateralism in the context of transnational criminal law, this Article accepted states' initial preferences-the
preferences that lead them to seek a multilateral treaty-as predetermined.
But those initial preferences came from someplace; they developed over
time, often under the influence of strong states. With power comes the ability to set agendas, 301 and transnational criminal law is no exception. According to a standard account, transnational criminal regimes directed against
moral harms like illicit drug use and "white slavery" have typically
30 2
originated with norm entrepreneurs from Europe and the United States.
Money laundering, now a globally recognized crime, is likewise an Ameri303
can invention.
Less powerful states, however, are not just passive "takers" of international law;3 0 4 norm entrepreneurs from peripheral states also play a role in
the formation and diffusion of global norms.30 5 Indeed, even if the United
States is a driving force behind most transnational criminal regimes, its interest alone cannot explain the nearly universal adoption of the suppression
conventions. Strong states can move issues to the top of the agenda, normatively sway some countries, and bring other countries on board through
linkages, payouts, and threats of sanctions. But the issue must still resonate
with enough other states to justify their investment in international conferences, negotiations, and domestic processes of ratification. 30 6 It is not surprising that transnational criminal issues do resonate broadly, as
transnational crimes by definition affect many countries, and many (even if
301. See, e.g., Simmons et al., supra note 167, at 791 (describing diffusion of policies through "soft"
coercion by powerful states that are able to frame policy debates and construct "ideational channels").
302. See generally Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global ProhibitionRegimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479 (1990).
303. See NADELMANN, supra note 68, at 388-89.
304. See Kathryn Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea of International
Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 389, 390 (2014) ("There is a need for scholars of international
norms to pay greater attention to the potential agency of states outside the Global North despite important structural inequality in the international system.").
305. See id. (discussing role of Latin American states in formation of international human rights
standards).
306. Cf Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 20, at 41 ("The impact of unilateral action ultimately depends on whether it is persuasive in shaping norms of behaviour. Perceptions of legitimacy will often
determine its effectiveness. Where a rule or norm advanced unilaterally is deemed to be illegitimate, it
will spur greater resistance, including challenges under . . . international law, undermining its
effectiveness.").
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not all) of those countries will want to see the crime suppressed.30 7 Thus, for
example, while the United States pushed for multilateral treaties that mirrored its FCPA, pressure to adopt these treaties also came from Latin American states that were frustrated by their inability to prevent foreign
corporations from bribing their officials. 3°0 And regardless of the U.S. preoccupation with the War on Drugs, Caribbean states supported the U.N.
Drug Trafficking Convention (as well as the ICC) out of concern that organby the drug trade was undermining state security and
ized crime spawned
30 9
rights.
human
In contrast, the United States could not single-handedly generate a similarly broad level of support for its recent effort to define a new transnational
crime: the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
related material. The United States, concerned after September 11, 2001,
that terrorists and rogue states could transport WMD easily by sea,31 0
sought to legitimate maritime interdictions of suspect cargo ships through
three multilateral forums. But in the absence of a strong multilateral consensus, none of these efforts have resulted in a truly global crime regime like
those for corruption and drug trafficking.
First, at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United
States took a leadership role in updating the IMO's primary terrorism
treaty. 311 Although the IMO eventually adopted an ambitious protocol that
included the new crime of illicitly transporting WMD and a multilateral
scheme of maritime interdiction, the final product did not have broad sup307. See Broude & Teichman, supra note 5, at 812-14 (considering reasons why countries might
tolerate or desire the "insourcing" of transnational crime).
308. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 114, at 679; see also Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the
International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 863, 893-94 (2001) (gathering evidence that countries other than the United States were
concerned about the problem of transnational bribery).
supra; see also Draft Resolution, supra note 101 (Caribbean states calling for an
309. See Part III.B.,
international criminal court to help enforce the Drug Trafficking Convention); Nadelmann, supra note
302, at 509-10 (acknowledging that U.S. efforts to globalize drug control regimes depended on other
states sharing similar perspectives on drug control). Some of the Caribbean support for a multilateral
treaty, however, was driven not just by concern about the drug problem, but also by the specter of U.S.
intervention.
310. See John R. Bolton, The Bush Administration's ForwardStrategy for Nonproliferation, 5 CHI.J. INT'L
L. 395, 395 (2005).
311. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
openedfor signatureMar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter SUA Convention]. The
SUA Convention was inspired by a terrorist attack against a cruise ship in the 1980s, which drew
attention to a gap in international law regarding violence at sea that was not piratical. See, e.g., Helmut
Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 337 (2008); Christopher Young, Balancing Maritime Security and
Freedom of Navigation on the High Seas: A Study of the Multilateral Negotiation Process in Action, 25 U.
QUEENSL. L.J. 355, 357 (2005). On the U.S. leadership role in updating the SUA Convention, see
Young, supra, at 358 & n.12. Specifically, the United States volunteered to lead the correspondence
group responsible for drafting treaty language, and it first proposed the inclusion of the new crime of
"transporting] items related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in violation of
applicable international non-proliferation agreements." Id. at 357-58 (quoting IMO Leg. Comm'n, 84th
Sess., IMO Doc. LEG 84/6/1 (Mar. 22, 2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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port: According to the IMO's Secretary General, the final conference was one
of the most politically charged in IMO history. 31 2 The final draft was also
not adopted consensually-as is typically the case-due to the concerns of
India, Pakistan, and Russia. 3 13 Ten years later, only thirty-three states have
314
ratified the Protocol (the United States is not one of them).
Second, the United States used its position on the U.N. Security Council
to secure a resolution that obligates all states to increase their counterproliferation efforts. 315 Given the unusually legislative scope of the resolution, 316 the Security Council held an open debate to appease states without a
vote; more than a quarter of the U.N. member states participated. 317 Although most states had no meaningful ability to oppose Resolution 1540,
the United States and its allies did have to take into account the concerns of
other permanent members, particularly China and Russia. Thus Resolution
1540 did not include the definition of WMD trafficking sought by the
United States: it addresses only nonstate actors as potential proliferators
(rather than rogue states, as the United States would have preferred), and
China insisted there be no reference to maritime "interdiction."'3 18 Further,
while the resolution calls generally "upon all States . .. to take cooperative
action to prevent illicit trafficking" in WMD, it does not impose any obli319
gation on states to do so.
Third, the United States formed an ad hoc coalition to support the definition of WMD trafficking that it did want, as well as its desired means for
enforcing it (i.e., maritime interdictions). When President George W. Bush
announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003, it comprised a network of eleven countries.320 Achieving even this level of consensus, however, required pledging that the PSI would operate within the
bounds of existing international law. 321 The PSI may be contributing to the
gradual development of a stronger regime against WMD trafficking-one

312. Young, supra note 311, at 384.
313. See Young, supra note 311, at 384 n.145.
314. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments 422-25 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.imo
.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status% 20-%2020 14%2ONew%2OVersion
.pdf.
315. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
316. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 874-75 (2003)
(summarizing concerns about legislating through the U.N. Security Council).
317. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
318. Id.at 6.
319. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). Resolution 1540 does require
states to adopt and enforce laws to prevent non-state actors from acquiring or transporting WMD and
related material; states must also ensure the physical security of existing WMD, police borders, and
establish export controls. Id. at paras. 2 & 3.
320. J. Ashley Roach, ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI): Countering Proliferation by Sea, in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND CHINA 351, 351-52 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds.,

2006).
321. See Emma Belcher, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for Using Nonbinding Agreements 8
(Council for Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2011).
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hundred states now support the PSI, at least nominally 322-but significant
countries like China, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Malaysia con32
tinue to oppose the effort.
In sum, when it came to WMD proliferation at sea, the United States
could set the agenda and shape the debate, but it could not necessarily cajole, pressure, or buy both the outcome it wanted and broad multilateral
agreement to support it.124 The point is not that the United States requires
broad multilateral agreement in order to act, but that even at the height of
the United States' hegemonic heft after September 11, it could not will a
multilateral treaty regime based on channeled unilateralism into being.
Broad multilateral agreement requires more than the flexing of U.S. power.
Once a broad consensus is formed and a multilateral treaty adopted, however, can the United States nonetheless coopt it to further its own purposes?
B.

Defining Criminality

To the extent that multilateral agreements trade generality for consensus,
they will leave room for variation in implementation around the margins. In
a system of channeled unilateralism, motivated states like the United States
can exploit these margins to promote their preferences from within the multilateral framework. For example, during negotiations for the Protocol
against Human Trafficking, states were divided over whether to include
3 25
Ulticonsensual sex work within the definition of human trafficking.
mately, no consensus formed; the decision was left to the discretion of individual states.3 2 6 Though the matter is not free from controversy even within
the United States, current U.S. foreign policy includes consensual prostitution within the framework of sex trafficking-and it has exported that definition through a unilateral sanctions regime instituted around the same
time as the Protocol's adoption.3 27 Thus, even though the Protocol leaves to
states the decision of whether or not to criminalize the transporting of consensual sex workers, the threat of lost aid from the United States has caused
some states to adopt the United States' preferred definition.328 Professor
322. Bureau of Int'l Security & Nonproliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (Nov. 20, 2012),

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm.

323. See Belcher, supra note 321, at 9; Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., Enhancement by Enlargement: The
ProliferationSecurity Initiative viii (Rand Nat'l Defense Research Inst. 2008).
324. But see Alvarez, supra note 316, at 875 (suggesting that similar U.N. Security Council legislation
has implemented U.S. hegemonic policies).
325. See ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 25 (2010).

326. See Janie Chuang, The United States As GlobalSheriff Using UnilateralSanctions to Combat Human
Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437, 445 (2006).
327. See id. at 439-40, 444 n.24, 450 (2006); Anne T. Gallagher & Janie Chuang, The Use of Indicators
to Measure Government Responses to Human Trafficking, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER
THROUGH CLASSIFICATION & RANKINGS 317, 335-38 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). U.S. law does
distinguish, however, between sex trafficking generally and "severe" forms of sex trafficking that involve
force, fraud, or coercion, and it limits core operative provisions of its sanctions regime to the latter
category of conduct. See Chuang, supra note 326, at 450.
328. See GALLAGHER, supra note 325, at 486.
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Philip Alston has similarly criticized U.S. trade preferences for invoking the
terminology of International Labour Organization conventions but without
incorporating the concomitant international standards.129 The United States,
he argues, "is, in reality, imposing its own, conveniently flexible and even
elastic, standards upon other states."33 0
This criticism is valid, but it is not the full story. First, the United States
is not insensitive to this problem; Professor Sarah Cleveland has described,
for example, the United States' evolving attention to international standards
in the context of human rights and economic sanctions.33 ' The United States
has more recently exhibited a similar effort in the human trafficking context, with a "dramatic shift" in its reporting regime's "treatment of the
relationship between trafficking and prostitution, bringing the current posi33 2
tion much more in line with accepted international standards.,"
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether these U.S.-defined standards
are displacing international standards or are instead just another input in a
continuing discursive process. Returning to the human trafficking example,
scholars who have been critical of U.S. unilateralism in this field nonetheless
acknowledge the positive role that U.S. policy has played in the "progressive
normative development" of victim-oriented standards. 33 In their words,
"[a]necdotal evidence strongly suggests that the [U.S.] Reports have contributed to raising the profile of trafficking at the international, regional,
and national levels; that they have nudged compliant governments to move
further and faster; and that they have compelled recalcitrant ones to take
steps that would otherwise have been unthinkable. "334
Meanwhile, a recent survey of domestic legislation implementing the Protocol found that "no two definitions of trafficking in persons are identical. '" ' Interpretive flexibility at the margins of multilateral treaties can
empower peripheral states by leaving more space for "localization," or the
building of "congruence" by domestic actors between international norms
and local beliefs and practices.3 36 Consider in this light the OECD's transnational bribery convention, which leaves room for states to except culturally
329. See generally Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism"?,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71 (Lance A. Compa et al.eds., 1996).

330. Seeid. at 79; see
also Bach & Newman, supra note , at 521 (identifying how, in the absence of a
multilateral consensus regarding securities regulation, the SEC has used bilateral agreements to pressure
foreign regulators to reform domestic laws to mirror U.S. laws).
331. See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 71-72.
332. Gallagher & Chuang, supra note, at 338.
333. Id. at 339-40.
334. Id.at 340; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking and a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworksfor Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.*1143, 1147
(2003).
335. Allain, supra note 76, at 137.
336. See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT'L ORG. 239 (2004); cf.
Bodansky, supra note 20, at 345-46 (invoking
principle of subsidiarity in arguing that multilateral responses to environmental problems should still
leave room for state-specific "values and politics").
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appropriate gift exchanges from the prohibition against bribery, as long as
those exceptions are codified. Professor Elizabeth Spahn has argued that by
allowing states to define their own line between bribes and gifts, the OECD
convention enables states struggling with systemic corruption to harness
other states' legal systems in enforcing those distinctions. 37 The ability to
shape the development of criminal prohibitions is not a prerogative that
resides solely with the stronger state.
C.

Who Benefits?

Motivated states also see a broad and deep range of benefits from these
transnational criminal regimes. Consider just a few examples: Motivated
states may suffer disproportionately from the transnational crime in question
and thus benefit more significantly from increased cooperation to suppress
it. More aggressive enforcement efforts may placate domestic constituencies,
as with the U.S. War on Drugs. Encouraging other states to update their
laws can restore the competitive advantage of the motivated state's industries to the extent that they are already subjected to the stricter standards
domestically. 338 And not to be underestimated, in return for their law enforcement investments, motivated states may collect significant fines and
forfeitures from foreign firms or actors for criminal conduct that occurred
339
primarily in other states.
Even though the distribution of benefits may be uneven, however, other
states also stand to benefit from increased harmonization and cooperation.
For limited states, which share the motivated state's concern about the underlying crime but not its resources, channeled unilateralism helps shift
costs to the motivated state by encouraging it to shoulder the initial brunt
of law enforcement and political capital outlay. Indeed, limited states particularly vulnerable to transnational crime, whose institutions risk corruption
or outright attack if criminal networks are targeted, may sometimes prefer
exporting sensitive prosecutions to stronger states. 340 By helping states harmonize their laws and increase their law enforcement cooperation, the treaty
also increases interoperability of law enforcement efforts. Over time, this
337. See Spahn, Local Law, supra note 123, at 249.
338. This is a dynamic often cited to explain U.S. interest in concluding an anti-bribery convention,
though it is more generally applicable to regulatory regimes. See Bradford, supra note 23, at 6.
339. To take one exceptional FCPA case, Siemens paid $800 million to the Department of Justice and
the SEC, and another $800 million to the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office. Garrett, supra note 201, at
1786.
340. In a recent joint U.S.-Colombian drug trafficking investigation, for example, Colombian police
encouraged their U.S. counterparts to request extradition for twelve additional suspects out of concern
that corruption would prevent their prosecution in Colombia; when the United States did not request
their extradition, all twelve cases were indeed dismissed by allegedly corrupt local judges. See Operation
Bean Pot, supra note 74, at 11-12. As this example suggests, "supranational normative regimes" can also
empower domestic police forces to distance themselves from corrupt governments and align themselves
with collaborative transnational efforts. See Goldsmith et al., supra note 31, at 79.
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coordination makes transnational investigations cheaper and thus more feasible for resource-constrained states.
Less powerful states can also use the bilateral agreements encouraged by
the suppression conventions to obtain technical assistance and other aid from
their wealthier counterparts.3 4 It is possible that states could secure greater
payouts in the absence of the multilateral treaty; for the same reason that the
treaty lowers the transaction costs for motivated states to negotiate these
agreements, it reduces the leverage weaker states have for extracting payments. This assumes, however, that the motivated state would pay more for
these agreements in the absence of the treaty-the alternative might instead
be no agreements. And the existence of the treaty can also cut in the opposite direction: by formalizing the multilateral consensus, it can empower
3 42
weaker states to push back on overreaching by motivated states.
The calculation of comparative benefit is complex and context-specific.
There is a risk that states with poor human rights records may use this
dynamic of channeled unilateralism to justify and obtain support for questionable practices.3 43 Or investigations by motivated states may displace
rather than complement the domestic efforts of limited, lagging, and reluctant states. 44 The observation here is simply that channeled unilateralism is
not a zero-sum game: even if the motivated state comes out furthest ahead,
other states will also have made progress down the field.
D.

Channeled Unilateralism in a Multipolar World

Channeled unilateralism relies on the participation of a powerful state, as
the motivated state's assertion of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction
must be backed by some amount of resources, clout, or force (if not all three)
in order to be effective. But given the multilateral framework, the powerful
state need not be a hegemon. In fact, channeled unilateralism should work
well in a multipolar world as a tool for sharing the burden of building
transnational criminal law regimes.
Consider Canada. Whether for normative or instrumental purposes, Canada will care about a range of transnational criminal threats, but some of
these threats will be of greater concern than others. Channeled unilateralism
allows Canada to help shape transnational criminal regimes for all of these
crimes but then choose which crimes it will focus on suppressing as a moti341. See Blum, supra note 104, at 340 (acknowledging potential of bilateral treaties to favor the
stronger state, but noting that "[p]ackage deals, adjustments, and side-payments that may compensate
for discriminatory application" are easier to arrange in bilateral context).
342. Cf Sikkink, supra note 307, at 391 (noting Latin American countries' use of multilateral
processes to counter U.S. intervention). Bat see Ramharack, supra note 262, at 101 (noting that some
Caribbean states initially balked at signing Article 17 agreements with the United States, despite domestic concerns about escalating drug trafficking, due to sovereignty concerns).
343. See Alvarez, supra note 316, at 876.
344. See Davis et al. supra note 167, at 12 (summarizing critiques of institutional complementarity
theory).
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vated state. Other states may, in the meantime, shoulder the enforcement
burden for the remaining transnational crimes.
A rough example of this sort of burden-sharing can be seen in the grow3 45
ing regime to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,
a problem at the intersection of regulatory and criminal law. 3 46 Regional

fishery management organizations (RFMOs) protect particularly sensitive
fish stocks in specific geographic regions, with enforcement efforts
spearheaded by regionally strong states that have a vested economic interest.
These regional efforts are backed by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) 47 and by the obligation to cooperate in protecting migratory and straddling fish stocks established by the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. 348 The end result is broad multilateral support for the suppression of
all IUU fishing but a division of labor in monitoring high seas fishing based
on fish stock and location.
Thus Australia, France, South Africa and the United Kingdom have increased unilateral and bilateral enforcement efforts in the Antarctic region to
tackle IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish (more pleasantly known as Chilean sea bass), efforts that have been at least partly successful.3 49 In the northeast Atlantic, the European Union, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Russia
board and inspect each other's fishing vessels to ensure regulatory compli345. IUU fishing includes such illegitimate fishing practices as "noncompliance with fishing seasons,
fishing without proper permits, catching prohibited species, using illegal fishing gear, catching more
than the allowable quota, and not reporting or underreporting the amount of fish caught." Kevin W.
Riddle, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation Contagious?, 37 OCEAN
DEV'T & INT'L L. 265, 266 (2006).

346. IUU fishing is often hard to detect and can be highly lucrative, but it also requires significant
resources to outfit deep sea fishing vessels. See, e.g., id. at 266, 273. Thus it has increasingly attracted
organized crime. Some IUU fishing, however, remains more of a regulatory problem, due either to incomplete adoption of regulatory norms or to defections from collective agreements made possible by the
challenge of monitoring and enforcing these agreements across vast oceans.
347. See UNCLOS, supra note 37, part V & art. 117.
348. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88 thereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement). The Fish Stocks Agreement is intended to help implement Articles 63 and
64 of UNCLOS. While 166 states have ratified UNCLOS, membership of the Fish Stocks Agreement is
more limited with only 82 states parties. See ChronologicalLists ofRatifications of Accessions and Successions to
the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 3 October 2014, U.N. Off. of Legal Aff., Div. for Ocean Aff.
& the Law of the Seas (last updated Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists of_ratifications.htm. The FSA includes default provisions for maritime interdictions of fishing
vessels by RFMOs; though the RFMOs have not been adopted these provisions verbatim, they may still
serve as a useful starting point for future regional or bilateral negotiations. See DOUGLAS GUiLFOYLE,
SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 104, 108-10 (2009).
349. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 348, at 144-54 (describing Australian and French bilateral and unilateral enforcement efforts against IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish); Warwick Gullett & Clive Schofield, Pushing the Limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French Cooperative Surveillance and
Enforcement in the Southern Ocean, 22 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 545 (2007) (same); see also Riddle,
supra note 345, at 267, 283 tbl. 7, 284 (citing RFMO estimates that, due to increased enforcement
efforts, IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish has dropped by a third, although it still comprises more than
half the annual harvest of the fish stock).
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ance. 310 For suspicious vessels flagged by other states, they coordinate to use
diplomatic action, trade sanctions, and import restrictions on illicit catches
to pressure the flag states into fuller compliance with their obligations
"
under UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement. 35
' Meanwhile, Canada, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, with significant cooperation from China, patrol the North Pacific against high seas drift net fishing
of salmon.35 2 Members of this RFMO also board and inspect each other's
fishing vessels on suspicion of fishing violations; although China is not a
member of the RFMO, it has a long-standing and successful shiprider agreement with the United States that enables the United States to monitor and
inspect Chinese-flagged vessels as well.3" 3 Japan meanwhile has tried to influence the fishing practices of non-members Taiwan, China, and South Korea through a unilateral documentation scheme meant to prevent
35 4
importation of illegally caught salmon into Japan.
An alternative outcome to this sort of division of labor is that states will
compete for jurisdiction over transnational crimes. Such competition can
waste scarce law enforcement resources and strain otherwise good diplomatic
relations. Furthermore, because there is no rule of double jeopardy or non bis
in idem under international law-separate sovereigns can generally prosecute
a defendant for a crime for which he or she has already been tried in another
country3 55-it puts defendants at risk of multiple prosecutions and multiple
35 6
punishments.
While a real likelihood, and a real challenge, the number of cases that
will instigate jurisdictional conflicts is likely to be small. 357 For most transnational criminal cases, cost is a limiting factor. If the value of pursuing
these cases typically outweighed the costs, there would be no need for channeled unilateralism in the first place. 358 The risk of jurisdictional conflict
will therefore be greatest when significant fines or forfeitures are at stake (for
350. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 348, at 124; ROSEMARY GAIL RAYFUSE, NON-FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 213-14 (2004).
351. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 348, at 130.
352. See Riddle, supra note 345, at 276-79. Enforcement efforts against stateless vessels on the high
seas are based on UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225, which called for a moratorium on high seas
drift net fishing effective in 1991. See id. at 276. The United States has prosecuted at least two stateless
fishing vessels for high seas driftnet fishing. See id. at 273-74; see also GuILFOYLE, supra note 348, at
120-24 (discussing enforcement activity).
353. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 348, at 118-19.
354. See id.
355. See SATZGER, supra note 92, at 9; Anthony J. Colangelo, DoubleJeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A
Jurisdictional Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 806-07 (2009). However, extradition treaties often
include a provision barring extradition if the suspect has already been tried by the state receiving the
extradition request, and some states like Canada and the Netherlands, as a matter of national law, will
not retry individuals already judged by another state's courts. See Colangelo, supra, at 809-10, 817-18.
356. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 201, at 1839, 1844-52.
357. See Stephan, supra note 194, at 54.
358. Cf id. at 68 (arguing in the context of foreign bribery that "the long record of prosecutorial
inaction outside the United States puts the burden on critics to explain why we should anticipate a
sudden switch to over-prosecution").
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example, with foreign bribery) or political valence is high (for example, with
terrorism).
In these cases, some aspects of channeled unilateralism will help minimize
conflicts. Thanks to the multilateral treaty, states should be in general
agreement about the content of the criminal prohibition, reducing the risk
of discord over whether the conduct is in fact illegal. Some of the suppression conventions also include duties to notify other potentially interested
states and to consult with them regarding which state will exercise jurisdiction first.35 9 In addition, bilateral cooperation agreements often identify
which state has preferential jurisdiction in different circumstances, 60 and
they can be used to encourage the sharing of any resulting forfeitures.?6 1 The
networks fostered by increased bilateral cooperation also encourage open dialogue about the division of cases and any resulting fines.3 6 2 The more that
states cooperate with each other, the easier it will be to resolve these issues
on an ad hoc basis.
Ad hoc solutions, however, tend to be better at protecting the interests of
states than defendants. Like-minded states may be able to agree in advance
on a transsubstantive, multilateral framework-embodied perhaps in a
memorandum of understanding-that enshrines both a duty to consult and
the consideration of defendant interests. Such a framework might require,
for example, that due process-type factors be weighed alongside pre-identifled state interests, with provisions for mediation when disagreements cannot be resolved. 363 But what about jurisdictional conflict with non-like359. See Colangelo, supra note 355, at 855-57 (noting, inter alia, similar provisions included in UNCAC and the OECD bribery convention).
360. See, e.g., U.S.-Nicaragua Agreement, supra note 290, art. 10; U.S.-Malta Agreement, supra note
290, at art. 6; U.S.-Cook Islands Agreement, supra note 293, at art. 6; see also Christopher A. Whytock &
Yimeng Dou, Continuity in TransatlanticRelations: Policy Convergence and the Domestic Internationalizationof
EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation 12-13 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n Ann. Meeting Paper, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 2299608 (describing EU-U.S. agreements to coordinate
antitrust enforcement activities).
361. See, for example, Canada's bilateral forfeiture agreements. E.g., Agreement Regarding the Sharing of Forfeited or Confiscated Assets and Equivalent Funds, Can.-Ant. & Barb., Oct. 14, 1999, 1999
Can. T.S. No. 36; Agreement Regarding the Sharing of Forfeited or Confiscated Assets and Equivalent
Funds, Can.-Trin. & Tobago, Sept. 4, 1997, 1997 Can. T.S. No. 26; see also, e.g., U.S.-Malta Agreement,
supra note 290, art. 12.
362. See Kate Brookson-Morris, Current Developments: Public International Law - Conflicts of Criminal
Jursdiction, 56 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 659, 660-61 (2007) (describing nonbinding "guidance" adopted by
United States and United Kingdom that directs prosecutors to consult in instances of concurrent jurisdiction); Colangelo, supra note 355, at 850 (noting that enforcement networks can enable early and
informal resolutions of concurrent jurisdiction); Whytock & Dou, supra note 360, at 10, 19 (describing
coordination of antitrust enforcement activities through increasingly close interaction of U.S. and EU
regulators).
363. The European Commission has suggested this sort of framework for European states. See Brookson-Morris, supra note 362, at 663 (discussing EC Green Paper, On Conflicts ofJurisdictionand the Principle
of Ne Bis In Idem in Criminal Proceedings). On what such due process-type factors might look like, see
Brookson-Morris, supra note 362, at 665, and Colangelo, supra note 355, at 845 (proposing a reasonableness standard for evaluating an individual's right to avoid repeated prosecutions). See also SATZGER, supra
note 92, at 40-41 (noting emergence of a new "principle of distribution of competences" meant to
account for these types of considerations).
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minded states? China's recent anticorruption campaign increases the salience
of these questions.364 Currently the absence of a concrete framework for protecting defendant rights is not an insurmountable hurdle to using channeled
unilateralism, but left unaddressed it may soon be.
V.

BEYOND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

This Article has argued that unilateralism operating within a multilateral
framework can further collective goals (such as the suppression of transnational crime) while promoting greater treaty compliance. Given the strictures of international law, channeled unilateralism may be the most practical
workaround to the enforcement gap in transnational criminal law. But the
enforcement gap is not limited to transnational crime, and channeled unilateralism may be relevant to other transboundary harms. In regulatory contexts, civil or administrative sanctions can provide an opportunity for
channeled unilateralism comparable to criminal law enforcement.1 65 When
might channeled unilateralism be effective in such regulatory contexts?
First, there must be a broad, multilateral consensus about the underlying
norm. This emphasis on convergence of interests distinguishes channeled
3 66
unilateralism from accounts of unilateralism as a law-making mechanism
and as a source of unintended rransnational regulation. 367 Second, the consensus should be embodied in a formal treaty, or at least in a formalized
multilateral framework. There are many reasons why states may opt for different forms of agreement, but the theory of channeled unilateralism developed here relies upon the effects of legalization. For example, formalized
commitments increase the sense of constraint experienced by the motivated
state; they also heighten the dissonance for lagging states when their inertia
is contrasted to the efforts of others.
Third, the enforcement target should be a private or economic actor,
which may include state-owned entities. It is possible for a treaty regime to
leverage unilateral enforcement efforts directly against states, but the causal
dynamics would differ from those analyzed here. Instead of states punishing
other states qua states, channeled unilateralism relies on indirect mechanisms for promoting compliance. Fourth, there must be a motivated state
with significant resources and a dominant role in the relevant market. Fifth
and finally, there should be opportunities for structured bilateral cooperation to address the harm. This bilateral cooperation provides additional vectors for promoting compliance indirectly, such as the transfer of technical
364. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, Presumed Guilty in China's War on Corruption, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2014, at Al.
365. Indeed, much FCPA enforcement by the United States is carried out by the SEC through civil
penalties.
366. See, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 20.
367. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 23.
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expertise and increased efficiency in investigations, both of which help resource-strapped states participate in transnational enforcement.
Given these considerations, some likely candidates for channeled unilater368
alism include the regulation of banks and other financial institutions; policing of labor conditions based on International Labour Organization
conventions; promotion of aviation and maritime safety standards; and protection of environmental interests369-especially where there is broad normative commitment, such as with the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES).3 70 In all of these areas, there are market-dominant states with an interest in shoring up transnational standards; the
targets of regulations are primarily private actors; broad international consensus about a problem and its potential solution has been embodied in a
multilateral framework; and the needed reforms are just costly enough that
37 1
many states will require an extra impetus to adopt and implement them.
All that may be missing in many of these cases are treaty provisions that
make appropriate unilateral efforts cheaper and more feasible. When multilateral treaties provide tools that help concerned states reach further and
cooperate more intensively, the resulting dynamic relationship between unilateralism and multilateralism can advance both individual state interests
and compliance with the treaty regime.

368. See Katzenstein, supra note 6, at 310-11 (describing similar dynamics in context of economic
sanctions and bank regulation).
369. See Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 20, at 32-35, 40 (describing transnational environmental law
in terms of dialogue between international and unilateral processes).
370. See Bodansky, supra note 20, at 346 (noting U.S. Pelly Amendment, which authorizes trade
sanctions in response to CITES violations); see also James W. Coleman, UnilateralClimate Regulation, 38
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2014) (discussing how well-considered unilateral regulation of carbon emissions could encourage regulatory action by other states even in the absence of a multilateral convention).
371. Similar dynamic effects between unilateral policies and international organizations can also be
identified even in the absence of a multilateral treaty; in those cases, the motivated state plays more of a
law-development role. See Bach & Newman, supra note 86, at 521 (discussing insider trading laws and
IOSCO); cf Whytock & Dou, supra note 360 (discussing bilateral cooperation and policy convergence in
antitrust enforcement).

